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INTRODUCTION

. eyes, but do not see.

They have ears, but do not hear; noses, but do not smell.
They have hands, but do not feel.
Psalms 115:5-71
Although the days of its dominion in our culture are numbered, the
written word still shapes our lives. Because it is immutable, the written
word preserves the details of our thoughts and experiences against the
shortcomings of our memories. If ever we should forget what we once
thought or did, it can remind us of those things as completely and exactly
as we originally recorded them. Because it is portable, the written word
allows us to communicate over great distances with people we cannot
speak to-or see. As a result, our search for knowledge is bounded neither
by the limited range of our personal mobility, nor by the parochialism of
our local friends and acquaintances. Because it is both duplicable and durable, the written word permits us to contact many more people than we
can meet in our own lifespans. Reproduced in potentially countless copies,
it can reach a multitude of our contemporaries; thus distributed, it stands
a good chance of surviving (in at least one copy) long enough to influence
later generations. At the same time, it can bring us the ideas of a whole
host of present and past personalities.
The written word has been so powerful in our society that it has conditioned our very vocabulary. Twentieth century American English is full of
'

Revised Standard Version.
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idioms that in some way refer either to writing or to its modern mechanical analogue, print. When an event is inevitable, we say that "the writing
is on the wall." When we become convinced that someone is going to lose
a contest or a race, we "write them off." When something is obvious, we
say it is "black and white," the colors of the printed page. When we want
someone to appreciate the deeper meaning of an event, we ask that they
"read between the lines." In academic journals, many scholars interpret
the world and its many social and intellectual phenomena as so many
"texts." Writing- and print-based expressions have become especially popular in the paper-choked prescincts of the law. Law students frequently
say that real law is "black letter." A policeman who charges a suspect
with every conceiveable offence "throws the book" at him. A careful judge
is supposed to follow "the letter of the law."
Such a consummate embrace of the written word has not been without
its costs. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the immediate European
progenitors of our culture turned increasingly to writing to help preserve
information and customary lore that had been primarily perpetuated and
celebrated in sound, gesture, touch, smell, and taste.2 Once this corpus
was inscribed, and thus removed from its original multisensory context, it
slowly but indubitably became the creature of the medium that claimed to
sustain it. Writing encouraged subtle alterations in the style and sometimes even the substance of age-old traditions and tales. From the sixteenth century, as the printing press stimulated the universalization of literacy, writing's social and intellectual grip on Western societies became so
strong that more traditional channels of communication lost a crucial measure of their surviving legitimacy.3 Literate groups no longer satisfied with
2

For discussions of writing's growing use and impact during this period, see MICHAEL T.

CLANcHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRrrTEN RECORD: ENGLAND

1066-1307 (1979) [hereinafter

MEM-

ORY]; BRIAN STOCK, THE IMPLICATIONS OF LITERACY: WRITTEN LANGUAGE AND MODELS OF

(1983); JAMES W. THOMPSON,
THE LITERACY OF THE LArrY IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1963). Recent scholarship has emphasized
that some medieval European groups used writing for important public and private purposes prior to
the twelfth century. See, e.g., ROSAMOND McKITTERICK, THE CAROLINGIANS AND THE WRITTEN
WORD (1989); THE USES OF LITERACY IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE (Rosamond McKitterick ed.,
INTERPRETATION IN THE ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH CENTURIES

1990). The twelfth and thirteenth centuries nonetheless constitute a watershed during which the gen-

eral incidence and influence of writing increased dramatically.
3 The classic introductions to the subject of print's impact are ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE
PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF CHANGE: COMMUNICATIONS AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1979); MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY:
THE MAKING OF TYPOGRAPHIC MAN

(1962).
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merely sharing the cultural stage began competing for outright social and
intellectual hegemony against the institutions and classes that continued to
employ and embrace older expressive forms. In the process, spoken rhetoric was denigrated.4 Gestures were demeaned. 5 Theater was suppressed.
Paintings were whitewashed and sculptures .were smashed.7 Smells and
tastes were striken from the accepted vocabulary of literary expression. 8
The initially harsh, even violent literate campaign against these media
eventually gave way to a grudging tolerance, and in some European countries (such as baroque France and Italy) traditional media even experienced a limited revival, but considerable damage to their original social
and intellectual status had already been done.'
The cultural decline of 'speech, gesture, image, touch, smell, and taste in
the face of writing's triumph is hardly surprising. After all, readers and
writers have no need of such devices to understand or to be understood.
Readers do not derive information from the pages of books by listening to
them or feeling them or smelling them (modern-day "scratch and sniff"
aside); 10 writers do not communicate their messages by the direct manipulation of sound, gestures, images, or scents. Today we certainly have not
abandoned these forms of expression-we still speak, sing, gesture, dance,
4 See, e.g., BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

ENGLAND 227-66 (1983); Hugh M. Davidson, The Decline of Rhetoric in Seventeenth Century
France, in I THE HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE (Kenneth
W. Thompson ed., 1987).
5 One sixteenth century Protestant commentator thus wrote: "Some foolishly imagine that praier
[sic] is made either better or worse by the jesture [sic] of our bodyes [sic]." Keith Thomas, Introduction to A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GESTURE 6 (Jan Bremmer & Herman Roodenberg eds., 1992).

1 See, e.g., Michael O'Connell, The Idolatrous Eye: Iconoclasm, Anti-Theatricalism and the
Image of the Elizabethan Theater, 52 ENG. LITERARY HIST. 279 (1985).
7See, e.g., JOHN PHILLIPS, THE REFORMATION OF IMAGES: DESTRUCTION OF ART IN ENG-

LAND 1535-1660 (1973).
8 See LUCIEN FEBVRE, THE PROBLEM OF UNBELIEF IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: THE RELIGION OF RABELAIS 423-32 (Beatrice Gottlieb trans., 1982); ROBERT MANDROU, INTRODUCTION TO

MODERN FRANCE, 1500-1640: AN ESSAY IN HISTORICAL PSYCHOLOGY 56-57 (R.E. Hallmark
trans., 1976).

9 On the eventual rejection of traditional media within European baroque cultures, see, for instance, James van Horn Melton, From Image to Word: Cultural Reform and the Rise of Literate
Culture in Eighteenth Century Austria, 58 J. MODERN HIsT. 95 (1986).
"o For true bibliophiles, these sensory experiences may nonetheless be the source of some pleasure. Thus, the comment of nineteenth century English essayist William Hazlitt: "Oh, delightful!...
to cut open the leaves [of a book], to inhale the fragrancy of the scarcely dried paper." William
Hazlitt, On Reading New Books, MONTHLY MAG., July 1827, quoted in HOLBROOK JACKSON, THE
ANATOMY OF BIBLIOMANIA 608 (1981).
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and so forth-but we have shifted them from their former position at the
center of our cultural universe to a distinctly secondary, more restricted
role. They are rarely welcome in our world of "serious" intellectual communication, and when they do appear there (for example, in liturgy or
theater), they are strictly regulated by written scripts.11
In addition to influencing our behavior and our attitudes towards each
other, our tendency to identify serious intellectual communication with
writing has profoundly affected our attitude towards past and contemporary societies that have had little or no experience with the written word.
Heedless of their actual learning, creativity, and depth, we have all too
often imposed on these cultures our own conclusions about which forms of
cultural expression are important. More concerned with what we perceive
to be their weaknesses than with their strengths, we have condescendingly
labeled their members "illiterate" or "inarticulate." In so doing, we have
implied either that their lack of literate skills makes them inherently inferior, or that their tendency to set little or nothing down in writing
amounts to them saying nothing at all.
As this century has progressed, more and more scholars have rejected
these negative characterizations. It is no coincidence that they have done
so while writing and thinking in the midst of a Western culture that,
under the influence of new technologies and new media, has begun to
rediscover and rehabilitate previously delegitimated forms of communication. In the decades after 1920, for example, a number of prominent
scholars began to reconceive preliterate and marginally literate cultures
positively as "oral," that is to say, based on spoken rather than written
communication. 2 At the same time, their own culture was rapidly reacquainting itself with the sound of the human voice. The telephone and the
phonograph, the two great "talking machines" of the late nineteenth century, were by this period ubiquitous, and the novel mass medium of radio
1 To most people in our society, these scripts are more "real" than the religious services or
performed plays based on them. This fact may help to explain why, for instance, we study Shakespeare on the page instead of on the stage.
2 See, e.g., MILMAN PARRY, L'EPITHETE TRADITIONNELLE DANS HOMERE (1928), translated
in THE MAKING OF HOMERIC VERSE 1 (Adam Parry ed., 1971); H. MUNRO CHADWICK & N.
KERSHAW CHADWICK, THE GROWTH OF LITERATURE (1932); HAROLD A. INNIS, EMPIRE AND
COMMUNICATION (1950); HAROLD A. INNIS, THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION (1951). For the most
elaborate and detailed version of this proposition see WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY:
THE TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD (1982).
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was speaking to European and American householders for hours on end."3
Sensitized to the place and power of oral communication in their own
surroundings, scholars of this era predictably took a greater interest in its
4
role and influence in other societies.'
Theirs was doubtless an important academic breakthrough, but it was
not critical. After all, speech is merely the oral form of the written word.
As two scholars have since noted:
The idea that the Great Transformation was [therefore] from speaking to writing [was] a statement of how much we focus on words,
how much we see words as the key form of expression, the key to
mentality, and even the key to humanity itself. The spoken word
may be different from the written word, but ... [t]he gap between
writing and speaking is but a small leap compared to the chasm
between words and everything else. 5
More recently, a further intellectual shift seems to have occurred.
Younger scholars studying preliterate and marginally literate cultures (as
well as, to some extent, our own society) have developed a greater appreciation for nonverbal expression, especially the visual forms of gesture,
dance, and image.' It is no coincidence that these forms are the staples of
"s On the modem "aural revolution," see Cynthia Ozick, The Question of Our Speech: The

Return to Aural Culture, in METAPHOR AND MEMORY (1991); Frank A. Biocca, The Pursuit of
Sound: Radio, Perception and Utopia in the Early Twentieth Century, 10 MEDIA, CULTURE &
Soc'Y 61 (1988).
' For a rare acknowledgement of the intellectual impact of radio on scholars writing as late as
the early 1960s, see ERIC A. HAVELOCK, THE MUSE LEARNS TO WRITE: REFLECTIONS ON ORALrTY AND LITERACY FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 30 (1986) ("Why, in particular, this focus
on the spoken language in contrast to the written? ... We had all been listening to the radio, a voice
of incessant utterance, orally communicating fact and intention and persuasion, borne on the airwaves
to our ears.").

" James Carrier & Achsah Carrier, Every Picture Tells a Story: Visual Alternatives to Oral
Tradition in Ponam Society, 5 ORAL TRADITION 354, 354 (1990).
6 A good example of this heightened awareness is the recent admission of one expert in "oral
history" that "for ... peasants, the quintessential 'unheard' people, the visual dimension is absolutely
crucial to their stories." Dan Sipe, The Future of Oral History and Moving Images, 19 ORAL HISTORY REV. 75, 84 (1991); see also FRANCOIS GARNIER, LE LANGAGE DE L'IMAGE AU MOYEN AGE
(1982); JUDITH L. HANNA, To DANCE IS HUMAN: A THEORY OF NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION
(1979); KARL F. MORRISON, HISTORY AS A VISUAL ART IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY RENAISSANCE (1990); A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GESTURE, supra note 5; Carrier & Carrier, supra note 15;
Harold Scheub, Body and Image in Oral Narrative Performance, 8 NEW LITERARY HIsT. 345
(1977). Prior to the late 1970s, scholars such as Marshall McLuhan and Walter Ong had written
about nonverbal media and their impact on present and, to some extent, past societies, but neither had
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television, the new medium on which virtually all of these scholars were
weaned. Unlike the telephone, the phonograph, or the radio, television has
radically extended our perceptual sensitivities. Although it incorporates
speech, it is significantly nonverbal. It deals in forms of expression that
are not readily translated into, or from, writing. Television has had such
an intellectually liberating impact that it has even encouraged some scholars to consider the anthropological and historical role of touch, smell, and
taste-media that are not only nonverbal, but nonvisual.1 7 In the wake of
all these efforts, the term "oral culture" appears increasingly inadequate
as a characterization of a preliterate or marginally literate society.,
The conceptual inadequacy of "oral culture" may have far-reaching intellectual consequences. In the last half-century, many media theorists
have argued that due to society's dependence on communication for its
very survival, media shape society in their own image." Relying on a
given medium (or a complex of media) for the propagation of significant
information encourages communities to favor behavior and beliefs compatible with the character and use of that medium (or that complex). Applying this theory, proponents of orality claim to have found the essential
qualities of sound and the spoken word reflected in the social practices
and values of their "oral cultures," thereby making that concept sociologically as well as technologically significant.20 If, however, their identification of the media base of these societies turns out to have been inappropriately limited, many of their sociological conclusions premised on that
used his observations to formally rework the prevailing speech-oriented concept of "oral culture."
17

McLuhan recognized early on that "TV has opened the doors of... perception ...

to the

non-visual world," MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA 54 (1964), but most scholarly
progress in this area is of much more recent vintage. See, e.g., PAUL STOLLER, THE TASTE OF ETHNOGRAPHIC THINGS: THE SENSES IN ANTHROPOLOGY (1989); THE VARIETIES OF SENSORY EXPERIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE SENSES (David Howes ed., 1991) [hereinafter VARIETIES].
18 Anthropologist Ruth Finnegan has recently made a similar point in the rather more limited
context of "oral poetry," the dominant literary genre of most oral cultures: "it is emerging more and
more that when we speak of 'oral poetry'... we need to take account of more than just the words...
. [T]he analysis of oral poetry now really has to be extended into the spheres of kinesics, visual
expression, and communication media or symbols more generally." RUTH FINNEGAN, ORAL POETRY:
ITS NATURE, SIGNIFICANCE AND SOCIAL CONTEXT xi-xii (1992) (italics in original).
"9 Thus, McLuhan's famous aphorism, "The medium is the message."
20 See ERIC A. HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO (1963); WALTER J. ONG, THE PRESENCE OF
THE WORD: SOME PROLEGOMENA FOR CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS HISTORY (1967); ONG, supra
note 12.
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identification must be doubted. If not totally wrong, these conclusions are,
at the very least, too ambitious.
As yet, the growth of academic interest in the use and cultural implications of different media has had relatively little impact on legal scholarship in general, and on Anglo-American legal writing in particular. 1 The
disciplinary disinterest may be partly due to the fact that the legal profession has only begun to be seriously affected by new aural and visual technologies. Indeed, while society as a whole has started to lose interest in
writing, lawyers have seemingly become more insistent upon it, and have
taken to stuffing libraries, registrars' offices, and their own filing cabinets
with written records at an unprecedented rate. Still actually and metaphorically bent over their writing desks, they have given little thought to
the legal applications and implications of alternative media either in their
own society or in others.
The specific indifference of Anglo-American legal academics may additionally be a by-product of cultural heritage. Having officially rejected the
Catholic Church in favor of Protestantism, Anglo-American culture from
the sixteenth century onwards pointedly suppressed the institution that
most successfully employed and defended nonwritten media in a world
otherwise dominated by writing. In this context, Anglo-American scholars
have found it easy to be oblivious to those media. Of course, under the
pressure of print, the cultural significance of speech, gesture, and other
traditional forms of expression eventually declined even in Catholicism's
Continental stronghold. The greater acceptance and prosperity that the
Catholic faith enjoyed on the Continent nonetheless managed to keep
those forms more in the public eye there, thus preserving them as fit subjects for scholarly scrutiny. Once modern technological changes revived
their prominence and popularity, they were relatively more accessible to
academic investigation.2 2
21 Continental legal scholars have notably shown some interest in the subject since the early

nineteenth century. See, e.g., Jacob Grimm, Von der Poesie im Recht [1815], in 6 JACOB GRIMM,
KLEINERE SCHRIFTEN 152-91 (1882); JACOB GRIMM, DEUTSCHE RECHTSALTERHOMER (1828);
JULES MICHELET, ORIGINES DU DRoIT FRANCAIS CHERCHEES DANS LES SYMBOLES ET FORMULES

DU DROIT UNIVERSEL (1837), in JULES MICHELET, 3 OEUVRES COMPLETES (1973); JOSEPHPIERRE CHASSAN, ESSAI SUR LA SYMBOLIQUE DU DROIT PRIMITIF (1847). Unfortunately, very little

of this pathbreaking work and the scholarship it has inspired has been translated into English.
11 Note, for instance, the leadership of French scholars in chronicling and analyzing the history
of gesture. GARNIER, supra note 16; JEAN-CLAUDE SCHMITT, LA RAISON DES GESTES DANS
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Lately there have been signs that our days of disregarding the relationship between law and modes of communication may be coming to an end.
In 1979, Michael Clanchy published From Memory to Written Record:
England 1066-1307,23 a book that documented the gradual rise of writing as the dominant medium of English law and administration between
the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. In The Electronic Media and the
Transformation of Law, a much grander work published in 1989, M.
Ethan Katsh attempted to chronicle and assess the historical impact of
speech, script, print, and electronic media on the concept of legal precedent, styles of dispute resolution, the doctrine of copyright, the development of the legal profession, and the idea of individual rights in a variety
of different contemporary and historical societies.24
For all their interesting and important insights, both books have significant limitations. Both Clanchy and Katsh apparently subscribe to the
superceded argument that societies which have little or no experience with
writing are fundamentally oral. They consequently conceive of most preliterate and marginally literate law as living in speech. Ironically, the
younger of the two, Katsh, is more thorough-going in these respects. He
dismisses nonverbal varieties of what he terms "preliterate" expression in
four pages dealing with ritual and ceremony. 25 This intellectual move
does him considerable damage, given his desire to relate the legal practices
and values of different societies to the characteristics of their media.2" As a
result of confining his sensory focus, his conclusions concerning the nature
and structure of law in preliterate and marginally literate cultures are at
worst compromised, and at best cheapened. In describing the early forms
of English legal and political communication that writing initially suppleL'OCCIDENT MEDIEVAL (1990); Jacques Le Goff, Gestures in Purgatory,in THE MEDIEVAL IMAGINATION 86 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1988).
2 See supra note 2.
'

M.

ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW (1989).

For a recent article developing Katsh's analysis in the realm of audio-video technology, see Ronald K.
Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 509 (1992).
25 KATSH, supra note 24, at 60-63.
26 Relying heavily on Katsh (and, ultimately, Ong), Collins and Skover are guilty of the same
oversight when they purport to describe the law of preliterate and marginally literate societies solely
under the heading of "Law and the Spoken Word." Subsequently, however, they reveal the limitations of both their subtitle and their overarching cultural model by spending several paragraphs talking about the ritual and "visual drama" of law in oral societies. Collins & Skover, supra note 24, at
516-18.
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mented and eventually displaced, Clanchy takes nonverbal media more
seriously, but he nonetheless gives them minor billing. Neither author
draws on the growing corpus of anthropological and historical literature
analyzing the vital communicative roles of gesture, touch, smell, and taste
in preliterate and marginally literate societies.27
Because neither Clanchy nor Katsh pays much attention to the role of
nonverbal communication in preliterate and marginally literate culture
and law, neither seriously considers how or why different media may be
employed simultaneously to deliver complementary parts of the same message. Katsh in particular seems not to have recognized that in societies
having little or no experience with writing, different expressive forms routinely appear and work together. Far from operating in splendid isolation,
speech functions in a sensory environment where oral, visual, and other
media constantly supplement, modify, reinforce, and sometimes even purposefully contradict one another. 28 Applied to preliterate and marginally
literate law, this observation suggests that more attention should be paid
to how, why, and with what effect the various aural, visual, and other
sensory elements of a legal message combine to create an overall
impression.
In this Article, I offer the concept of "performance culture" as a vehicle
for remedying these rather basic deficiencies in the legal literature. At one
level, "performance culture" is just another name for "oral culture." Both
terms refer to societies having either no experience with writing, or so
little experience with that medium that their preliterate expressive and
intellectual habits persist essentially unchanged. Among these societies I
29
count pre-Hellenistic Greece (to the middle of the fourth century B.C.),
biblical Israel, early and middle republican Rome (to the first century
27

See supra notes 16-17.

28 This point was not entirely lost on such pioneering media theorists as Innis and McLuhan. In

1951, Innis observed, "In oral intercourse the eye, ear, and brain, the senses and the faculties acted
together in busy co-operation and rivalry each eliciting, stimulating and supplementing the other."
INNSs, supra note 12, at 105. McLuhan occasionally spoke of "audile-tactile" man and offered such
mysterious pronouncements as "speech is an outering (utterance) of all of our senses at once."
McLUHAN, supra note 3, at 43, 93. Neither scholar, however, was willing to concede the inadequacy
of his "oral" terminology for describing sensory phenomena far more complex than the terms "oral
intercourse" or "speech" would properly admit.
29 The suggested chronological termini for the performance cultures identified here are, of
course, approximate; in each instance, individual scholars differ slightly on when writing became a
significant social force.
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B.C.), early medieval Europe (to the end of the thirteenth century A.D.),
and surviving indigenous communities in Africa, South America, Asia,
and the Pacific.30 At a deeper level, however, the term "performance culture" represents a radically different conception of preliterate and marginally literate communication. First, the general reference to "performance"
in this context reflects the fact that in preliterate and marginally literate
societies, significant information is delivered through many media and not
just orally.. Individuals in these societies are "performers" in the sense of
being culturally fluent in speech, gesture, touch, smell, and taste. Second,
the distinctly theatric connotation of "performance" makes it especially
suited to the preliterate and marginally literate practice of employing several media at the same time in the same significant message. For both
these reasons, as well as others, the phenomenon of "performance" has
become the focus of much attention in the anthropological literature,3 1 and
using this word to replace "oral" as a broad cultural characterization
seems only appropriate.
Such a reconception of how members of a particular group of societies
communicate requires a reassessment of their forms of legal expression.
Like all other types of meaning in performance cultures, law and legal
understandings are conveyed not only orally, but also in gesture, touch,
scent, and flavor. They are not only heard, but seen, felt, smelled, and
tasted. The nature of some of the media used to carry legal messages in
performance-based societies may seem quaint and even bizarre to us, but
unlike ourselves, members of these cultures take all media seriously, and
30 It is currently unfashionable to generalize across so many societies. It must be acknowledged,
however, that in this age of academic super-specialization most historians and anthropologists "have a
vested interest in the particularity of the individual culture that they have taken such pains to understand." Richard Posner, Medieval Iceland and Modern Legal Scholarship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1495,
1501 (1992). What is more, if societies are allowed to defy comparison by virtue of their supposed
uniqueness, "then one is condemning research in the human sciences ... to a singular impoverishment." JACQUES LE GOFF, TIME, WORK AND CULTURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 365 n.109 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1980).
11 See, e.g., RICHARD BAUMAN,
BURN,

SINGING OF BIRTH

VERBAL ART AS PERFORMANCE (1977); STUART H.

BLACK-

AND DEATH: TEXT IN PERFORMANCE (1988); JOHANNES

FABIAN,

POWER AND PERFORMANCE: ETHNOGRAPHIC EXPLORATIONS THROUGH PROVERBIAL WISDOM AND

(1990); ELIZABETH FINE, THE FOLKLORE TEXT: FROM PERFORMANCE
TO PRINT (1984); Richard Bauman & Charles L. Briggs, Poetics and Performance as Critical Perspectives on Language and Social Life, 19 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 59 (1990); John M. Foley,
Word-Power, Performance, and Tradition, 105 J. AM. FOLKLORE 275 (1992); Scheub, supra note
THEATER IN SHABA, ZAIRE
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therefore do not hesitate to use all available media forms to communicate
serious legal information. Frequently used in combination, these forms
serve the same functions, and thus deserve the same respect, as the lengthy
documents that often replace them in our society.
In order to provide the reader with direct evidence for these contentions
and a proper context in which to set them, I will devote part II of this
Article to considering how members of different performance cultures use
or have used each of the basic sensory media to communicate general and
legal meaning. First, I will review the significance and sorts of aural communication in a variety of performance cultures, and investigate how law
is aurally expressed in those environments. This portion of the Article will
necessarily draw on work already done by disciples of "orality," although
I will highlight aural forms of communication and legal expression that
frequently are overlooked. I will then turn to conceptions and forms of
performative visual communication, and will consider the varieties of visual legal expression in performance-based societies. A brief examination
of the significance of tactile communication in performance cultures will
follow, leading to a survey of tactile modes of conveying legal information.
From that point, I will investigate methods of performative communication that use the savory senses of smell and taste, and will analyze how
those media are put to legal purposes. In part III, I will discuss how and
why members of performance cultures "perform," that is, combine various
media in single messages, and will describe how and why they use the
same communicative strategy in legal expression. In that part, I will also
consider how information may be distributed among the different sensory
components of performance and will assess what that distribution means
for our interpretation of performative culture and law. The conclusion
will put all this material in perspective, and for the purpose of introducing the reader to the *subject of a future paper, it will offer a few preliminary hypotheses concerning the deeper implications of performance for the
cultural practices and legal values of the societies it dominates.
While following this discussion, the reader should bear in mind five
points-two methodological and three substantive. First, this Article is
only an impressionistic survey of forms of communication and legal expression found in performance cultures. Because of the uneven nature of
the available source material, parts of this survey are necessarily less elaborate than others. Far from providing answers, existing general and legal
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literature frequently fails to pose the questions that must be asked before
more detail can be added. In the meantime, I ask the reader to pardon any
lacunae in the text.
Second, despite my analytic separation of modes of general expression
from modes of legal expression, I do not mean to suggest the existence of
some great divide between culture and law. On the contrary, I believe that
law is very much embedded in culture. This is especially true in performance-based societies where law largely lacks the refuge of writing, which
can fix it physically, isolate it intellectually, and hence, shelter it from general cultural currents. Separating culture from law is nonetheless a convenient stylistic device that allows me to associate and analogize cultural
and legal practices while highlighting the latter for a reading audience
composed of legal scholai's and specialists.
Third-turning to substantive as opposed to methodological matters-nothing I say in these pages is meant to suggest that all performance
cultures are absolutely alike. Compared to other societies, their forms of
communication and legal expression are sufficiently similar for them to be
considered members of a single cultural group, but that does not make
them identical in all respects. Specific performative communities are
shaped not only by their commdn media, but also by particular geographic, historical, political, economic, and religious circumstances. Different performance cultures may even function in subtly different communicative environments. For example, early medieval Europe may be
distinguished from most African performance cultures in that the former
had a writing-oriented past, and in its present embraced a faith officially
founded on God's written word. 2
Fourth, the reader must not mistake this Article's association of particular forms of communication and legal expression with performance cultures for a claim that those forms are necessarily peculiar to those cultures
and necessarily disappear with the spread of writing. Even when writing
becomes a significant social force, traditional expressive forms persist.
Judging from the historical experiences of such emergent "writing cultures" as Hellenistic Greece, Imperial Rome, and late medieval Europe,"3
32

Julia M. Smith, Oral and Written: Saints, Miracles and Relics in Brittany, c. 850-1250, 65

SPECULUM 309, 311. (1990). The latter quality would also distinguish biblical Israel.
" In this Article, I reluctantly use the term "writing culture" as the most convenient shorthand
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the initial popularization of writing decreases the extent of social and legal dependence on nonwritten media and in the process renders them less
powerful and less dispositive3 4 Many people nonetheless continue to use
those media to considerable social and legal effect. 35 This is especially true
of individuals belonging to marginalized social and gender groups (usually
the poor and women) that have little or no educational access to writing.
In the short term, the popularization of writing may even favor the elaboration of certain nonwritten forms of expression with which writing, as a
medium, is broadly compatible (that is, two-dimensional painting and
drawing, as opposed to three-dimensional sculpture).38
label for societies that have had enough experience with writing to significantly and perhaps even
profoundly alter their preliterate habits of expression and thought. In this context, it should be apparent that a "writing culture" is not simply a culture that possesses the technology of writing, but rather
is one that has significantly assimilated or "interiorized" that medium. Ancient Mesopotamia and
Hellenic Greece cannot, therefore, be classified as "writing cultures," despite the fact that a good
number of individuals within those societies could write. It should also be noted that in this Article,
"writing" in the context of the term "writing culture" refers to an intellectual skill (in the sense of the
general ability to "read and write"), as opposed to physical "handwriting" or "script." Thus, although the culture of Hellenistic Greece was largely based on manuscripts and the culture of modern
America is based on printed books, both societies are, broadly speaking, "writing cultures." Having
said this, I would agree that the technological and intellectual impact of print is different from that of
script, to the point where one might draw a useful distinction between "script" and "print" cultures
or, perhaps more accurately, between "graphic" and "text" cultures. See infra note 36. For present
purposes, however, the distinction between script/graphic and print/text societies is less important
than the basic discontinuity between performance-based societies and "writing cultures" as a whole.
"I On the rise of writing and the concomitant decline in the autonomy and importance of traditional media in Hellenistic Greece, see PETER BING, THE WELL-READ MUSE: PRESENT AND PAST
IN CALLIMACHUS AND THE HELLENISTIC PoETs (1988); WILLIAM V. HARRIS, ANCIENT LITERACY
116-46 (1989); ERIC HAVELOCK, THE LITERATE REVOLUTION IN GREECE AND ITS CULTURAL

CONSEQUENCES (1982). For late republican and Imperial Rome, see HARRIS, supra, at 175-284. For
late medieval Europe, see MARGARET ASTON, LOLLARDS AND REFORMERS: IMAGES AND LITERACY
IN LATE MEDIEVAL RELIGION (1984); JANET COLEMAN, MEDIEVAL READERS AND WRITERS,
1350-1400 (1981); HARVEY J. GRAFF, THE LEGACIES OF LITERACY 75-106 (1987); Paul Saenger,
Books of Hours and the Reading Habits of the Later Middle Ages, in THE CULTURE OF PRINT:
POWER AND THE USES OF PRINT IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (Roger Chartier ed., 1988).
"I One classical scholar has, for instance, commented that "the Greek and Roman worlds always
remained highly dependent, by modem standards, on oral communication; this was true ... even in
the cities of ...Hellenistic Greece and . . . the high Roman Empire." HARRIS, supra note 34, at 29.
The difference between these cultures and their performative predecessors, therefore, is not that the
former suppressed nonwritten forms, but rather that they no longer depended on those forms to carry
the full weight of social and legal messages. Thus, while oral communication survived as an important
medium, it lost a significant measure of its autonomy and authority, being increasingly used for dictating or reading written documents.
11 It is this phenomenon that prompts me to prefer the term "graphic culture" to "script culture"
as a specific characterization of such early writing cultures as Hellenistic Greece and late medieval
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Fifth, finally, and in a related vein, the reader must remember that for
all its attention to the practices of societies with little or no experience
with writing, this Article is in some sense also about ourselves. As I stated
at the beginning of this introduction, we all speak, sing, gesture, and so
on, even if-under the influence of writing, as that influence has been
extended and amplified by print technology 37-we generally refrain from
using those media to convey primary cultural information (including, almost by definition, most of our legal meanings). Moreover, we are living
at a time when writing is rapidly losing its social and ideological hegemony. As it gradually gives way to such audio-visual media as television
and computers,38 our preferred styles of communication and legal expression will increasingly come to match the sensory capacities and prejudices
of these new technologies. Perhaps by gaining a greater appreciation of
communication and legal expression in cultures not dominated by writing,
we may indirectly familiarize ourselves with (and prepare ourselves for)
some of the forms that learning and law are likely to take once our own
Europe. See supra note 33. "Graphic" potentially denotes both chirographic (written) and iconographic (painted or drawn) representation and takes account of the intimate and fertile relationship
that historically has existed between these forms, and which becomes especially powerful in societies
that are just becoming familiar with writing (to appreciate this point, simply consider the splendid
synthesis of chirography and iconography that is the medieval illuminated manuscript). "Script," on
the other hand, denotes writing only and misleadingly suggests that early writing cultures are solely
oriented towards the written word. Taking this analysis a step further, using the term "text culture"
to specifically describe the writing culture of, say, nineteenth century Europe is preferable to using the
term "print culture" because it more accurately communicates the cultural focus on written words-at
the expense of pictures-that the technological and chromatic limitations of print have historically
encouraged. I hope to elaborate on these distinctions and their social and legal implications in later
papers.
37 Because it is easier to produce and easier and cheaper to duplicate than script, print greatly
facilitates the spread of written materials and literary. Moreover, it is only under the impetus of print
technology that a society can become so familiar and so suffused with the written word that its high
literates can truly "afford" to challenge the authority of nonwritten media without fear of destroying
the cultural corpus. Thus, the chronological coincidence between the growth of printing and the sensory upheavals that marked the Reformation. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
"s Of course, writing is not about to disappear. In the short term, at least, it will simply take
new, more overtly graphic forms and will be used in new, less autonomous ways. On the future of
writing in our society, see JAY D. BOLTER, WRITING SPACE: THE COMPUTER, HYPERTEXT, AND
THE HISTORY OF WRITING (1991); MYRON C. TUMAN, WORD PERFECT: LITERACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE (1992); Richard A. Lanham, The Electronic Word: Literary Study and the Digital
Revolution, 20 NEW LITERARY HIsT. 265 (1989). For a tantalizing glimpse into the world of "virtual reality," a computer-generated sensory cocoon in which the status and utility of writing will be
far more problematic, see BENJAMIN WOOLLEY, VIRTUAL WORLDS: A JOURNEY IN HYPE AND
HYPERREALITY (1992).
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"age of writing" has passed.
II.

COMMUNICATION AND LEGAL EXPRESSION IN PERFORMANCE
CULTURES:

A

TENTATIVE TYPOLOGY

Before surveying the various types of communication and legal expression used in performance cultures, we must address, if not resolve, an
evidentiary problem. Where exactly do we look for information on
performative communication and legal expression, or for that matter, for
any other information on performance cultures? Very few performance
cultures survive in the modern world; the contemporary base of our cultural sample is thus profoundly limited. A greater number of performance
cultures existed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but
the Western ethnographers and anthropologists of that age were not much
interested in communication. When they did show an interest, bias,
prejudice, and unscientific methodology often compromised their research.
The historical record of past performance cultures is more problematic
still. Much of what we know of them is a function of what some of their
members chose to write down or draw. Unhappily, many aspects of
performative experience escape or resist transcription and even depiction.
Notwithstanding the best of intentions on the part of early record-keepers,
much sensory information from these societies must have been lost. 9
Abandonning our investigations in the face of such difficulties would
nonetheless be both premature and unfortunate. In recent years, unprecedented effort has been expended on studying the performance cultures that
remain. For all its problems, the anthropological and ethnographical research of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries yielded a significant amount of information on communication and legal expression in
performance-based societies that is consistent with more recent and more
overtly scientific findings. Finally, the rudimentary graphic record of past
performance cultures, regarded critically in light of what we know of
'9 Something of this problem-in a slightly different context-is reflected in an experience Sir
Walter Scott once had when he showed an old Scotswoman the printed texts of songs he had written
down from her singing: "the old woman was more annoyed than amused. He had spoiled them altogether, she complained. 'They were made for singing and not for reading, but ye have broken the
charm now and they['ll] never be sung mair. An the worst thing o'a' is, they nouther right spelled, no
right setten down.'" THE VIKING BOOK OF FOLK BALLADS OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD iX
(Albert B. Friedman ed., 1956).
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performative habits from other sources, offers invaluable insights into
performative life-, thought- and law-ways. Recognizing the potential impact of drawing and especially writing on the contents of the record, we
might consider that record with particular care, but it would be tragic to
throw the performative baby out with its bathwater.
A.

Aural Communication and Legal Expression
1.

The Cultural Significance of Sound

Performance cultures are invariably societies of sound. To this limited
extent, their frequent characterization as "oral" cultures is undeniably accurate. Outsiders from a writing culture might consider them noisy or
loud,40 but this somewhat pejorative assessment fails to take account of the
fundamentality of aural communication for groups that have little or no
access to writing. This fundamentality is reflected in many performative
metaphors of knowing and understanding. Whereas a member of our
visually oriented writing society might acknowledge a point with the expression "I see," members of a significant number of performance cultures
use aural idioms. When Aivilik Eskimos seek information, they say to
others or to themselves, "let's hear."' 41 The African Basotho consider "I
hear" to be equivalent to "I understand,' 42 as do the Suya Indians of
40 MITCHELL STEPHENS, A HISTORY OF NEWS 24 (1988). This passage from a recent sociologi-

cal study nicely captures the "loudness" of early medieval culture:
Noises permeated the streets of the medieval city from dawn to dusk. Street criers were
everywhere and kept up their business at all hours of the day. [They] proclaimed at dawn
that the baths were open and the water hot; then followed bawling vendors advertising fish,
meat, honey, onions, cheese, old clothes, flowers, pepper, charcoal, or other wares. Friars
from different religious orders swarmed over the city, demanding alms. Public criers announced death and other news. Street musicians provided entertainment but also could
annoy those with well-attuned ears.
Yi-Fu TUAN, SEGMENTED WORLDS AND SELF: GROUP LIFE AND INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS 126
(1982). On loudness and noisiness as socially-approved characteristics of personal deportment in medieval Anglo-Saxon society in particular, see Bruce Redwine, Decorum and the Expression of Intention in "Beowulf," "Njal's Saga" and "Chaucer" 75-89 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)). Redwine notably suggests that by Chaucer's lifetime (the middle to
late fourteenth century, by which point England had made the transition from a performance culture
to a writing culture), English decorum had come to favor 'soft sounds, if not outright silence. Loud
behavior was regarded as boorish and was openly ridiculed. Id. at 216-24.
41 EDWARD CARPENTER E-l AL., ESKIMO 25 (1959).
42 Charles R. Adams, Aurality and Consciousness: Basotho Production of Significance, in EsSAYS IN HUMANISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY:

A
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central Brazil. 43 Among the Ommura people of New Guinea, the verb
iero likewise means both "to hear" and "to know." 44 The word that the
pre-classical Greek philosopher and scientist Heraclitus used to mean
"know" (ksuniemi) originally meant "to know by hearing."' 4 1 In the early
fourth century B.C., Plato still equated individuals who knew much with
individuals who heard much. 46 Sound and hearing may even be metaphorical measures of wisdom: in ancient Norse mythology, the guardian of
heaven, Heimdallr, was so wise "that he could hear the wool grow on the
sheep and the grass grow in the fields."' 47 Conversely, members of performance cultures tend to identify idiocy with lack of hearing. Among one
group of Australian aborigines, the word for "deaf" (woadetra) also
means "stupid"; in another group, the foolish individual (wallukuta) lit' 48
erally has his "ear closed."
In addition to shaping its language, sound can also shape the very size
of a performative community. The first "sound barrier" in human history
was the geographic point at which individuals lost aural contact with one
another or with a central authority. Still fearing the social and practical
consequences of breaking this barrier in the early fourth century B.C.,
Aristotle argued against having too many people in a city: "Who will be
their crier unless he has the voice of a Stentor?"' 49 In the Middle Ages,
Grindal & Dennis Warren eds., 1979).
4' Anthony Seeger, The Meaning of Body Ornaments: A Suya Example, 14 ETHNOLOGY 211,
213 (1975).
" David Howes, Controlling Textuality: A Call for a Return to the Senses, 32 ANTHROPOLOGICA 55, 65 (1990).
41 Evelyn F. Keller & Christine R. Grontkowski, The Mind's Eye, in DISCOVERING REALITY:
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 207, 221 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983).
4 ROSALIND THOMAS, ORAL TRADITION AND WRITTEN RECORD IN CLASSICAL ATHENS

21

(1989).
"' Alexander Chamberlain, Primitive Hearing and "Hearing-Words," 16 AM. J. OF PSYCHOL.
119 (1905).
48 Id. at 127. On similar metaphorical identities in Indochinese languages, see George Devereux,
EthnopsychologicalAspects of the Terms 'Deaf and 'Dumb,' in VARIETIES, supra note 17, at 43-44.
In a fascinating article, anthropologist Anthony Seeger has suggested that another indicator of the
special importance of aural communication in several preliterate societies is the tendency of their
members to decorate and ornament those parts of the human body relevant to the creation or appreciation of sound. The efforts of the Suya people to highlight their mouths and ears with large ornaments thus reflect the prominence accorded to speaking and hearing in that culture. See generally
Seeger, supra note 43.
48 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 7.4 (Thomas A. Sinclair trans., 1962).

19921

COMING TO OUR SENSES

few villages were larger than the range of the crier's voice. Larger towns
(perhaps recognizing Aristotle's problem) were subdivided into smaller,
parmore aurally manageable wards.5" The territorial sweep of Christian
51
ishes was similarly delimited by the range of their churchbells.
As a medium, sound can of course take several forms. Most obviously,
it exists as speech. In a performance culture, speech has far greater power
and authority than it usually has in a writing culture. It is commonly
regarded as a force capable of both creating and destroying. Heeding the
words of Genesis, the ancient Hebrews believed that God made the universe by speaking ("And God said 'Let there be light,' and there was
light. . . .,).52 On the other hand, members of a variety of performative
societies in contemporary Africa avoid using certain words in certain ways
lest they do material harm to other persons or things. 3
Members of performance cultures additionally respect speech because it
carries their society's most cherished truths. Performative wisemen are
primarily talkers, not writers. Socrates, one of the last Greek sages to live
in a performative environment, never wrote down any of his thoughts.
This was not due to carelessness or lack of rigor; it was merely reasonable
behavior for an individual who had grown up in a society where speech
was the common coin of intellect. Only after Socrates' death did writing
begin to make serious intellectual headway in Greek culture, with the
result that Plato, Socrates' disciple, decided to record his own thoughts in
written form. These writings nonetheless took the form of "dialogues"
which, when read aloud according to prevailing literary practice, 54 pointedly recalled the central dynamic of performative aurality.
The social and intellectual prominence of speech among populations
50JAMES

BURKE, THE DAY THE UNIVERSE CHANGED

"I J.DOUGLAS

92 (1985).

PORTEOUS, LANDSCAPES OF THE MIND: WORLDS OF SENSE AND METAPHOR

50 (1990).
52 Genesis 1:3 et seq. (Revised Standard Version). On the power of speech in Hebrew tradition,
see SUSAN

A.

HANDELMAN, THE SLAYERS OF MOSES: THE EMERGENCE OF RABBINIC INTERPRETA-

17, 32-34 (1982).
Philip M. Peek, The Power of Words in African Verbal Arts, 94 J. AM.

TION IN MODERN LITERARY THEORY
83

FOLKLORE

19

(1981).
"' William B. Stanford, Sound, Sense and Music in Greek Poetry, 28 GREECE AND ROME 127
(1981). Oral reading of written works similarly typified the Middle Ages, although the habit became
less common as literacy rates increased in the thirteenth century and afterward. See Ruth Crosby,
Oral Delivery in the Middle Ages, 11 SPECULUM 88 (1936); Paul Saenger, Silent Reading: Its Impact
on Late Medieval Script and Society, 13 VIATOR 367 (1982).
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with little or no experience with writing inevitably gives great prestige
and power to good speakers. Judging from the Odyssey, the Homeric
Greeks regarded fine speakers as divinely blessed:
For one man is feebler than another in presence, yet the god crowns
his words with beauty, and men behold him and rejoice, and his
speech runs surely on his way with a sweet modesty, and he shines
and as he passes through
forth among the gathering of his people,
55
the town men gaze on him as a god.
African Limba culture likewise assesses people according to their ability
to "speak well." 5 6 Some performative societies even name themselves in
terms of their speech-skills. For instance, the name of the African Anang
people actually means "ability to speak wittily yet meaningfully on any
occasion.""
The inherent aurality of speech encourages members of performance
cultures to organize language in ways that are pleasing to the ear. One
reason why poetry is a leading type of performative expression is that,
with the assistance of rhythm and meter, it sounds better then prose. 8 In
this context, it is no accident that the greatest literary works of pre-Hellenistic Greece, Anglo-Saxon England, and early medieval Europe (the Iliad, Beowulf, and the Song of Roland) were, in their original forms, all
poems. Within poetry, and even at times within the confines of everyday
performative speech, additional aural devices such as alliteration and assonance may be used to highlight similar consonant or vowel sounds by
placing certain words in sequence. This passage from Beowulf is a nice
example of alliteration:
11

THE

ODYSSEY OF

HOMER 8.169-.173 (S.H. Butcher & A. Lang trans., 1900).

56 Ruth Finnegan, Attitudes to Speech and Language Among the Limba of Sierra Leone, 2 ODU
61, 70 (1968).
67 DICK LErrH & GEORGE MYERSON, THE POWER OF ADDRESS: EXPLORATIONS IN RHETO-

RIC 33 (1989).
58 On the cultural prominence of poetry in preliterate societies in particular, see DENYS THOMPSON, THE USES OF POETRY 77-85 (1978). In ancient Greece, "Prose as the medium of important
communication was slow in developing, and even after its appearance, it retained acoustic devices...
as late as the fifth and fourth centuries." Kevin Robb, Greek Oral Memory and the Origins of Philosophy, 51 PERSONALIT 5, 28 (1970). For a comprehensive study of the shift from poetry to prose in
late medieval Europe after the initial, albeit limited, rise of "popular" literacy there, see WLAD
GODZICH & JEFFREY KrTAY, THE EMERGENCE OF PROSE (1987).
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Straet waes, stig wisode

gumum aetgaedere. Gudbyrne scan
heard, hondlocen, hringiren scir
song in searwum.59
The impact of these words is largely lost if they are silently read instead
of spoken, that is, if language is considered a matter of sight rather than
sound. It is therefore not surprising that the use of these techniques and
even the social significance of poetry itself should decline in writing
cultures.
In addition to speech, sound can also take the form of music. Music is
ubiquitous in most performance cultures. Of course, the line between
speech and music is hardly sharp: song shares characteristics of both. The
great epics of our own performative past appear to have been sung, or at
least chanted. Homer's word for "poet" was notably aoidos, or "singer." 60
Frequently, poems were presented with instrumental accompaniment.
One thus envisions the Greek kitharode with a lyre, and the Anglo-Saxon
scop with a harp. Among the indigenous peoples of Africa, the presentation of epic poetry remains as much a musical as a linguistic event: a
strings, shaking
performance may involve singing, humming, strumming
61
rattles, beating drums, or ringing bells and gongs.
In performance cultures, however, music has other roles that are much
less obvious to members of writing societies who tend to think of it as
mere entertainment. The ancient Greeks, for instance, gave music a central place in schooling. The leader of the early Greek classroom was not a
"lecturer," but a "harpist," reflecting the importance of music in transmitting the epics that carried Greek knowledge and tradition from generation to generation.62 In the early fourth century B.C., Plato could still
Il BEOWULF vv. 320-23 (Michael Swanton ed., 1978). Only some of this passage's alliterative
qualities are preserved in translation: "The road was paved with stone, a path guiding the group of
men. The war-mail shone, hard with hand-forged links; the bright iron rings sang on their armour."
Id. For a discussion of similar aural structures in Greek poetry, both before the fifth century (until
which time "all Greek poets made their poems for hearing not for seeing, for the ear and not for the
eye") and after (when written poetry was still read aloud), see Stanford, supra note 54, at 127.
60 Robb, supra note 58, at 42 n.29. On the singing and chanting techniques that may have been
used by the Homeric poets, see M.L. West, The Singing of Homer and the Modes of Early Greek
Music, 101 J. HELLENIC STUD. 113 (1981).
*t ISIDORE OKPEWHO, THE Epic IN AFRICA 62-63 (1979).
62 HAVELOCK, supra note 20, at 124. In belated recognition of the pivotal role of music and,
more specifically, song in shaping the lives, lore, and learning of the early Greeks, a number of
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assert that the well-educated man was "one sufficiently trained in choral
performances" so that he could "sing and dance in a fine way.""3 Members of performative societies in contemporary Africa consider music a
necessary foundation for most meaningful social action. Thus,
[I]n the Republic of Benin there are special songs sung when a child
cuts its first teeth; among the Hausas of Nigeria, young people pay
musicians to compose songs to help them court lovers or insult rivals; men working in a field may consider it essential to appoint
some of their number to work by making music instead of putting
their hands to the hoe; among the Hutus, men paddling a canoe will
sing a different song depending on whether they are going with or
against the current. 4
In this context, music's aurality makes it an integral part of life, as opposed to a special cultural event.
Finally, members of performance cultures aurally communicate with
one another by miscellaneous sounds. Members of modern writing cultures frequently experience such sounds as grating intrusions appropriate
only in emergencies (one thinks of the honking of a horn or the blaring of
a siren). They are almost never employed in regular communication. In
performance cultures, however, sounds are the very stuff of life, pregnant
with emphasis and important meanings. Sounds effectively attract attention and frequently can carry further than speech or song. In north African Siwan society, for instance, the air may be filled with the ritual wailing of bereaved relatives. This is not an immature "noise," an aural
nuisance, or an inconvenience. 5 It is, instead, a useful manner of communicating a death over a wide geographic area. 6 Through the Middle
Ages, church bells played an analogously public role, summoning the
scholars have recently come to characterize early Greek society as a "song culture." See ANDREW
FORD, HOMER: THE POETRY OF THE PAST 14-16 (1992); JOHN HERRINGTON, POETRY INTO
DRAMA: EARLY GREEK TRAGEDY AND THE GREEK PoETic TRADITION 3-40 (1985).

e' PLATO, THE LAWS 2.654b (Trevor J. Saunders trans., 1970).
JOHN M. CHERNOFF, AFRICAN RHYTHM AND AFRICAN SENSIBILITY 34 (1979); see also
LEONARD W. DOOB, COMMUNICATION IN AFRICA: A SEARCH FOR BOUNDARIES

79 (1961);

KEVIN

B. MAXWELL, BEMBA MYTH AND RITUAL: THE IMPACT OF LITERACY ON AN ORAL CULTURE 4

(1983).
" The notion of sound being a nuisance or an inconvenience ("noise pollution") seems to be
peculiar to writing cultures (and within that broad category, "text cultures"), whose members need no
longer rely on sound for the propagation of cultural information.
" STEPHENS, supra note 40, at 24.
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faithful to Mass, warning local populations of raids and dangers, and otherwise tolling the hours. In an aurally sophisticated environment, everyone knew that different peals had different meanings.67 Loud
noises-such as the striking of drums or the explosion of firecrackers-still mark and communicate important life transitions among certain
African and Far Eastern societies that have not been completely overtaken
by writing.68 The sounds serve as aural exclamation marks for communities that continue to live by and through their ears.69
2.

The Sound of Law

Even in the midst of a writing culture, Anglo-American law has retained a significant measure of actual and metaphorical aurality.7 0 This is
especially evident in criminal procedure. In both England and America,
the accused is due a "hearing"; lawyers for the defense and for the prosecution call orally sworn witnesses who, under oral questioning, offer oral
testimony. Jurors are required to listen to that testimony, to oral arguments, and to the eventual instructions from the judge. In a few jurisdictions,71 jurors are not even permitted to take notes of what they hear.
After deliberation, they return to declare their verdict orally. The court,
after hearing further oral submissions, literally "pronounces" sentence.
The aurality that survives in Anglo-American law is nonetheless rigidly
confined by rules and regulations that more accurately reflect the plight of
sound in our society. In court, for instance, the "ear-witness" is anathema;
there are strict rules against hearsay, or reporting what one has heard as
opposed to what one has seen. Oral evidence is often inadmissible in the
17 JOHAN HUIZINGA, THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 10 (1949). On the communicative

role of church bells in the Middle Ages, see generally SOPHIA MENACHE, THE Vox DEI: COMMUNICATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 30 (1990).
8 See Rodney Needham, Percussion and Transition, 2 MAN 606, 606 (1967). Similar noisemaking takes place in our own writing culture (e.g., honking of horns and clanging of tin cans after
weddings), but the practice is generally more celebratory than communicative. We prefer other means
of publicizing and preserving the memory of important events.
6' I would like to thank Carrie Cottreau for this apt metaphor.
70 This statement is not, however, meant to imply that the English and American legal systems
retain equivalent measures of aurality. Scholars have long recognized that under the weight of considerable tradition, English law has preserved a greater number of oral forms and practices than has its
American counterpart. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND
THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1990) (in particular chapter 3).
" One such jurisdiction is Pennsylvania. See 234 PA. CODE § 1113 (1985).
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face of an adequate written instrument. In American civil cases, judicial
opinions are not delivered orally, but instead are published in accordance
with statutes. Out of court, oral conveyances of significant interests in land
are expressly forbidden, as are virtually all oral wills. In these latter contexts especially, Anglo-American law and lawyers are inclined to associate
aural communication with fraud, carelessness, and lack of legal
sophistication.
These circumstances and attitudes stand in stark contrast to those prevailing in performance cultures, where law is aural not because of tradition or ignorance, but because of necessity."2 For instance, in the absence
of writing, or in a context where writing is still a marginal social talent, it
is either impossible or inconvenient for the parties to a contract to agree to
anything "on paper." If language is to be employed at all, promisor and
promissee must orally set the terms of their agreement in the presence of
listening witnesses. Thus, in Rome at the time of the Twelve Tables (fifth
century B.C.), parties routinely bound themselves by an oral questionand-answer process called stipulatio. A creditor might ask a debtor: "Sestertium decem milia mihi dari spondesne?" ("Do you promise to give me
ten thousand sesterces?"). The debtor would reply: "Spondeo" ("I promise"). 3 Among the African Basotho people, similar oral agreements are
'74
actually called "soundings.
Oral communication is also prominent in performative conveyances. In
tenth century England, a grantor wishing to transfer land would have
made a speech like the following to his grantee and to witnesses: "I the
priest Athelnoth, grant the estate at Basing with all the lands King Edmund has given me, to the New Minster at Winchester for the benefit of
my soul, with the right of giving it to strangers and kinsmen with all the
freedom which King Edmund has given me."'7 5 A written charter might
"' In performance cultures, the dependence of law on aural communication is so great that deafmutes (individuals who cannot speak because they have never been able to hear) may be deemed
incapable of holding legal privileges and bearing legal obligations. For instance, in medieval Europe
until the twelfth century, deaf-mutes were not allowed to marry on the presumption that they could
not understand the meaning of the marriage ceremony. HARLAN LANE, WHEN THE MIND HEARS: A
HISTORY OF THE DEAF 93 (1984).
" Peter M. Ticrsma, Rites of Passage:Legal Ritual in Roman Law and Anthropological Analogues, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 8 (1988).
' Adams, supra note 42, at 310.
7 ANGLO-SAXON CHARTERS 55 (Agnes J. Robertson ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1956).
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capture what was said (as appears to have been the case here), but in
early medieval conveyancing law, the saying mattered more than the writing. Indeed, land charters in early medieval England were considered as
either records of sayings or (less frequently) scripts for sayings: their contents were intended to be both seen and heard, to the point where scribes
concluded many charters with valete ("goodbye"), "as if the donor had
just finished speaking with his audience." ' 6

FIGURE 1. Speaking a will. In this miniature from a medieval French manuscript of Gratian's
Decretum (composed c. 1140), a bedridden cleric declares his testamentary wishes to a colleague.

A man contemplating death in a performance culture likewise does not
write or sign his will; instead, he speaks his testamentary wishes to indi71 MEMORY, supra note 2, at 202. The use of valete may also have reflected the standard Roman (Latin) form for finishing a letter, but one has to remember that the classical practice of letterwriting itself had oral roots; even after writing had pushed Rome beyond "performance culture,"
people in a society that was still significantly short of universal literacy still intended letters to be read
aloud, just as they were dictated aloud.
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viduals gathered around him (see Figure 1). In the early Roman Republic, wills were pronounced before the Comitia Curiata (testamentum
calatis comitiis), before the army arrayed for battle (testamentum in
procinctu), or before five special witnesses (testamentum per aes et
libram).7 The orality of early English wills78 was sometimes reflected in
testators' very words. The conclusion of one Anglo-Saxon will, embodied
in writing for convenience, thus began: "Then I will that there be distributed for my soul, as I have now said to the friends to whom I spoke
...
,,' Another Anglo-Saxon document implied an oral delivery by its
casual reference to a bystander: "Here sits Leofeld, my kinswoman, [to]
whom I grant both my land and my gold ...and all that I own, after my
day."8 " Thanks to the form of the words, we can also "hear" this eleventh
century will spoken from a deathbed and afterwards recorded in the
Domesday Book: "Hark, my friends. I will that my wife shall hold this
land which I bought from the Church as long as she lives, and after her
death let the Church from which I had it take it. And should anyone
encroach on this land let him be excommunicated."8 " Down to the thirteenth century, it remained commonplace for an Englishman to make his
82
will "with his mouth" in this fashion.
The edicts or rules that are the more general laws of a performative
community are similarly publicized and perpetuated by speech. They are,
as they are still literally called in Yup'ik Eskimo culture, "oral teachings."8 3 They may be transmitted informally, from generation to generation, or alternatively they may be formally proclaimed to the people at
large. During the Republic and even in the days of the Empire, Roman
"

ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW 77 (1991).

On the orality of Anglo-Saxon wills in particular, see Brenda Danet & Bryna Bogoch, From

Oral Ceremony to Written Document: The TransitionalLanguage of Anglo-Saxon Wills, 12 LANGUAGE AND COMM. 95 (1992); Harold D. Hazeltine, Comments on the Writings Known as AngloSaxon Wills, preface to DOROTHY WHITELOCK, ANGLO-SAXON WILLS vii (1930).
" Burton F. Brody, Anglo-Saxon Contract Law: A Social Analysis, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 270,
286 (1969) (quoting BENJAMIN THORPE, DIPLOMATARIUM ANGLIEUM AEVI SAXONICI 500 (1865)).
s' Hazeltine, supra note 78, at xxx n.2 (quoting JOHN KEMBLE, CODEX DIPLOMATICUS AEVI
81

755 (1839)).
Id. (quoting DOMESDAY Boox 1, f. 177a).

82

MICHAEL M.

SAXONICI

THE ANGLO-SAXONS
83

(1990).

SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE CONVERSION OF
TO THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 186 (1963).

ANN FIENUI-RIORDAN, ESKIMO ESSAYS: YUP'IK LIVES AND How WE SEE THEM 205

1992]

COMING TO OUR SENSES

heralds read statutes and decrees aloud. 4 Anglo-Saxon kings dictated
their dooms in solemn witans (assemblies). 5 According to a mid-thirteenth century manuscript of the Icelandic Konungsb6k, "lawspeakers"
appearing before the general assembly were required to recite "all the
sections of the law over three summers and the assembly procedure every
summer."8 " In thirteenth century England, Henry III ordered his decrees
"to be proclaimed as law by the voice of a crier," a strategy that was
certainly effective in growing urban centers such as London, although it
may have been less practical in rural areas.8 7 Among the Nigerian Yoruba
people, new legislation was traditionally announced by a town crier who
was instructed to "go to every corner of the town, proclaiming and declaring the same in the hearing of the public."8 8 The significance of law's oral
proclamation tends to be recognized even in those performance cultures
possessing rudimentary written laws. Thus, in early medieval Europe,
"what mattered in the promulgation and enforcement of law remained the
[oral] word, whether of the king, his wise men, the judges or the local
legal experts."' 9
When performative laws are broken or legal rights are asserted, speech
takes on new meaning and significance. Individuals charged with an offense or legal wrong are not served with written process, but are summoned orally. In early medieval England, oral summons were frequently
delivered "by the crier's voice." 9 In the early Republic, Roman defendants were summoned by the voice of the complainant himself, a practice
reflected in the famous opening formula of the Twelve Tables: "If a man
calls another to law, he shall go." 91 Complainants similarly spoke out in
early medieval Iceland, where the word for a "legal claim" (mll) notably
" Callie Williamson, Monuments of Bronze: Roman Legal Documents on Bronze Tablets, 6
CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 160, 164 (1987).
8' HENRY R. LOYN, THE GOVERNANCE OF ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 500-1087, at 108 (1984).
88 LAWS OF EARLY ICELAND 187 (Andrew Dennis ed. and trans., 1980).
87 MEMORY, supra note 2, at 212 (quoting MArrHEW PARIS, 3 MATTHEI PARISENSIS CHRON-

ICA MAJORA in ROLL SERIES LVII 35 (H.R. Luard ed., n.p. 1872-1884)).
88 DOOB, supra note 64, at 245 (quoting I.C. Ajisafe, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE YoRUBA PEOPLE 22 (1924)).

8' Patrick Wormald, Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis: Legislation and Germanic Kingship,from

Euric to Cnut, in EARLY MEDIEVAL KINGSHIP 123 (P.H. Sawyer & Ian N. Wood eds., 1977).
80 MEMORY, supra note 2, at 220 (quoting RICHARD FITZNEALE, THE COURSE OF THE ExCHEQUER [DIALOGUS DE SCACCARIO] 116 (Charles Johnson ed. and trans., 1950)).
8 HERBERT F. JOLOWIcZ, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 179
(1939) (original in Latin).
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also meant "speech." 2 The dangers associated with summoning defendants in this direct manner are evidenced by this excerpt from the Icelandic
Ljbsvetninga Saga:
The winter passed uneventfully. In the spring the Norwegian went
to collect the payment on his wares, but Solmund gave a curt response. He said the goods were rotted and that he wouldn't pay.
The Norwegian went home, and a short time later he went together
with Forni and Arnor to summon Solmund .... The three brothers

listened for a while from their fortified house. Solmund said it was
clear that they shouldn't put up with this sort of thing. Soxolf then
jumped into action, seized his spear, and hurled it at the Norwegian;
it killed him on the spot. 3
It was somewhat safer to make an oral complaint before a communal assembly. Njal's Saga provides an Icelandic instance of such a public
declaration:
I give lawful notice against Flosi Thordarson ...in that he did

inflict on Helgi, son of Njal, an internal wound or a brain wound or
a marrow wound which did cause Helgi's death. I demand that he
be made an outlaw .... I give [lawful] notice to the Quarter Thing

which has lawful jurisdiction over this matter. I give lawful notice. I
give notice in the hearing of all at the Law Rock."
When individuals from performance cultures commence formal litigation to resolve a dispute, they submit no briefs and file no motions. Instead, they speak, argue, and swear oral oaths before judges, mediators, or
other authorities who ask oral questions of them and of their witnesses. If
written evidence for or against a claim exists, that evidence tends to be
suspect (largely due to the great danger of fraud and forgery in what is, at
best, a marginally literate society) and may have to be supported by oral
testimony, as often occurred in early medieval England. 5 Writings more92 Jeffrey L. Slusher, Runic Wisdom in Njal's Saga and Nordic Mythology-Roots of an Oral
Legal Tradition in Northern Europe, 3 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 21, 31 (1991).
" Ljosvetninga Saga, reprinted in THEODORE M. ANDERSSON & WILLIAM I. MILLER, LAW
AND LITERATURE IN MEDIEVAL ICELAND 121, 124 (1989).

" Slusher, supra note 92, at 26-27 (quoting NJAL'S SAGA ch. 141 (Magnus Magnusson &
Hermann Pilsson trans., 1960)).
0 MEMORY, supra note 2, at 209-21. On the analogous suspicion of written evidence in Hellenic Greece, see TONY M.

LENTZ,

ORALITY

AND LITERACY IN HELLENIC GREECE

77 (1989); on

the dimensions of the fraud problem in Greek society, see George M. Calhoun, Documentary Frauds
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over tend to be read aloud in performative legal proceedings, not merely
for the convenience of the many illiterates who may be present, but also
for the convenience of literates still living in an aurally oriented society."
Greek orators were known to demand the public reading of particular
decrees from inscribed stelai. 7 A defendant in a 1219 warranty of charter
case from Lincolnshire similarly claimed a hearing of his father's charter,
which appears to have been produced and publicly read."8
Performative disputes are quite literally talked out. In the language of
the African Limba people, the word for "law case" (hugbonkila ha) also
means a "speaking." 9 Cases are orally decided. Voices rather than writings make the law. The case record does not exist on any paper, but in the
aural memories of those present. If a case is appealed or doubted, the case
record must be presented orally by persons who heard the case argued and
resolved. In Archaic and Hellenic Greece, these individuals were formally
called mnemones or "remembrancers."' ' Medieval Europe knew of no
such officials, but one medieval authority advised the would-be suitor to
collect his friends in court, and "to pray them to be attentive to the words
which are spoken in the pleadings; to hear well and to recollect well, in
order that they may be able to record the plea when need shall
require."1 o
The aurality of performative law is reflected not only in the many occasions when law is spoken, but also in the aurally appealing structures
employed in law-speaking. For instance, early German and Anglo-Saxon
legal language was strongly rhythmic and metrical, reflecting its audience's love of alliteration and assonance. Consider (or, better still, recite)
this Anglo-Saxon oath of fealty, which preserves its aural characteristics
in Litigation at Athens, 9 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 134 (1914).
9

MEMORY,

17 THOMAS,

supra note 2, at 215.
supra note 46, at 64.

08 ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE 300 (Doris M. Stenton ed., Selden Society 53, 1934). A
generation later (1248), a clerical plaintiff appeared to be satisfied by simply being "shown" a charter. This acceptance arguably indicates the beginnings of a gradual shift towards a less aural, more
writing oriented legal culture. MEMORY, supra note 2, at 215.
" Finnegan, supra note 56, at 61.
100 ROSALIND THOMAS, LITERACY AND ORALITY IN ANCIENT GREECE 69 (1992). Significantly, the mnemones survived in name into the Hellenistic period, but by this point they had been
reduced to judicial clerks.
101 1 FRANCES PALGRAVE, THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE ENGLISH COMMONWEALTH 145
(London, John Murray, 1832) (quoting John of Ibelin, THE ASSIZES

OF JERUSALEM

ch. 45 (1266)).
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even in translation:
By the lord, before whom this relic is holy, I will be to N. faithful
and true, and love all that he loves, and shun all that he shuns,
according to God's law, and according to the world's principles, and
force, by word nor by work, do aught of what
never, by will nor 1by
02
is loathful to him.
The same aural patterns appear in this Anglo-Saxon witness' oath: "In
the name of Almighty God, as I here for N. in true witness stand, unbidden and unbought, so I with my eyes over-saw, and with my ears overheard, that which I with him say." 1 3 In ancient Ireland, legal expression
could even assume an overtly poetic form, as evidenced by this heavily
alliterative seventh century composition:
Ma be ri rofessor
recht flatho
fothuth iar miad,
mesbada slog
sabaid cuirmthige,
cuir mescae,
mess tire,
tomus forrag,
forberta diri,
dithle mesraid;
mormain mrugrechto:
mrogad coicrich,
cor culane,
corus rinde,
rann eter comorbu,
comaithig do garmaim,
gaill comlainn,
caithigthi astado....
202

If thou be a king thou shouldst know
the prerogative of a ruler,
refection according to rank,
contentions of hostings,
sticks (quarrels) in an ale-house
contracts made in drunkenness
valuation of lands,
measurement by poles;
augmentations of a penalty,
larceny of tree-fruit;
the great substance of land-law:
marking out fresh boundaries,
planting of stakes,
the law as to points [of stakes],
partition among co-heirs,
summoning of neighbors,
stone pillars of contest
fighters who fasten title.... 0 4

1 ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND

179 (London, Commissioners of the Public

Records, Benjamin Thorpe ed., 1840).
103

DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW

43 (1973) (quoting ANCIENT

LAWS

AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 102, at 181). For further discussion of the legal use of
these techniques, see Dorothy Betherum, Stylistic Features of Old English Laws, 27 MODERN LANGUAGE REV. 263 (1932).
104 D.A. Binchy, An Archaic Legal Poem, 9 CELTICA 152, 156-57 (1971). On versified laws in
general, see THOMPSON, supra note 58, at 109.
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Reflecting the communicative characteristics of its cultural environment,
performative law occasionally finds aural expression in music and song as
well as speech. Music, for instance, may mark the beginning or ending of
a legal procedure. In Africa, extended drumming may announce a legal
complaint or the opening and closing of indigenous courts.10 5 Song may
even play a part in litigation. Among the Mbala people of the Congo,
opponents intersperse their speeches with snatches of allegorical singing in
which their supporters join by voice and drum. This is an excerpt from
one case:
1st Party (speaking): I was in my house and would have liked to
stay. But he has come and wants to discuss the matter in public. So
I have left my house and that is why you see me here.
(singing): I am like a cricket. I would like to sing, but the wall of
earth that surrounds me prevents me. Someone has forced me to
come out of my hole, so I will 'sing.
(speaking): Let us debate the things, slowly, otherwise we will have
to go before the [writing-oriented] tribunal of the white people. You
have forced me to come. When the sun has set, we shall still be here
debating.
(singing): I am like the dog that stays before the door until he gets a
bone.
2nd Party (speaking): Nobody goes both ways at the same time. You
have told this and that. One of the two must be wrong. That is why
I am attacking you.
(singing): A thief speaks with another thief. It is because you are
bad that I attack you.106
Lest this practice be regarded as unduly alien and far-fetched, the reader
might consider that in the thirteenth century-reflecting, perhaps, an even
earlier tradition-English legal representatives were described by the
French term, conteurs, the same word used to describe early medieval
minstrels, or "singers of tales."'0° If not actually sung, legal pleadings of
this period may still have been chanted in a formalized tonal variant of
.ordinary speech that would have emphasized their significance by associ105

ROSE BRANDEL, THE MUSIC OF CENTRAL AFRICA: AN ETHNOMUSICOLOGICAL STUDY

39-

40 (1961); see also T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAw 220 (1956).
108 BRANDEL, supra note 105, at 39-40 (quoting Leo A. Verwilghen, in Album Notes to FOLK
Music OF THE WESTERN CONGO (1952)).

'" Michel T. Clanchy, Remembering the Past and the Good Old Law, 55 HIST. 165, 175

(1970).
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ating them with the musical-poetic foundations of the cultural corpus.
In some performance cultures with simple law codes, music may also be
employed to announce or teach the written law to a population that is
generally illiterate. Not only can music make law pleasing to the ear, but
it also can provide a melodic framework within which legal content may
be readily recalled. Some evidence indicates that the laws of Charondas,
the Greek Ionian lawgiver, were sung. °8 In this context, it may be no
coincidence that the classical Greek word for statute law, nomos, could
also mean "tune." 1 0 9 In his Problems, Aristotle actually speculated that
the single term carried both meanings "because before men could write,
they sang their laws to avoid forgetting them, as they still do among the
Agathyrsi..'. 0 As late as the first century B.C., Cicero referred to the
Twlve Tables that every school child memorized as a carmen necessarium, literally a "necessary song."''
Legal meaning in performance cultures may even reside in the miscellaneous sounds mentioned earlier." 2 For instance, sounds as well as speech
can summon people to court. In early medieval London, the ringing of a
bell served this purpose. If someone claimed not to have been summoned,
it wa said that "the beadle has no other witness, nor ought to have, than
the great bell which is rung for the folkmoot at St. Paul's."' 1 3 Members of
performance cultures may alternatively or additionally use a sharp, loud,
or piercing noise to announce legal transfers or transitions. In traditional
Roman law, both the mancipatio conveyance ceremony and the testemen'08

WILLIAM SEAGLE, THE HISTORY OF LAW 108 (1946). There is a similar story in Plutarch's

Lives, to the effect that in the early sixth century. "Solon sang his laws to the people [of Athens] in
verse (elegaic couplets) obviously because this was the way both to catch and to impress Greek ears."
Robb, supra note 58, at 43 n.37. Some scholars have refused to accept that anything so serious as a
set of laws could ever have been sung in ancient Greece, except perhaps as a parody. Others, however,
have disagreed: "That [laws] should have been set to music and associated with festive occasions is
fully in accord with the Greek sentiment, which saw in them not stern task-masters, but the companions of social life, friendly and intelligent advisers." SAMUEL H. BUTCHER, SOME ASPECTS OF THE
GREEK GENIUS 174-75 (Kennikat Press 1969) (1891). For a controversial article on the singing of
Greek laws, see Luigi Piccirilli, 'Nomoi' cantati e 'nomoi' scritti, 2 CIVILITA CLASSICA E CRISTIANA
7 (1981).
109 MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 54 n.10 (1986).
no ARISTOTLE, PROBLEMS 19.28 (Walter S. Hett trans., 1953).
"'
112

CICERO, DE LEGiaUS 2.59 (Clinton Keyes trans., 1943).

See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
supra note 2, at 220 (quoting WILLIAM STBS, SELECT CHARTERS & OTHER

113 MEMORY,

ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

313 (1900)).
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tum per aes et libram (which was merely its testamentary variant) required that a set of scales be struck with a piece of bronze. 1 Early medieval contracts were often made by the buyer slapping the palm of the
seller, an action that seems to have been calculated for aural as much as
physical effect."1 5 In central Africa, a death sentence may be pronounced
by a stroke on the royal drum." 6 In another part of Africa, land transfers
in the mid-twentieth century required the discharge of three gunshots over
the property conveyed.1 7 In this last instance, modern technology obviously provided the gun, but cultural aurality encouraged making the
noise." 8
B.

Visual Communication and Legal Expression
1. The Cultural Significance of Sight

Almost from the moment we are born into a writing culture, we are
trained to be visually oriented." 9 Our education is almost entirely dedicated to teaching us how to understand and to communicate visually
through reading and writing. In such an environment, our basic thoughts
and values quickly come to be expressed in visual terms and metaphors.
We have already encountered the ubiquitous modern expression "I see."
"4 JOLOWicZ, supra note 91, at 145; WATSON, supra note 77, at 77.
115 JEAN BRISSAUD,

A HISTORY

OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW

495 (1912). This practice still sur-

vives among cattle traders in France, England, and Denmark. See DAVID S. THOMSON,LANGUAGE
74-75 (1975). On the tactile aspects of hand-slapping, see infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
t BRANDEL, supra note 105, at 39.
1

ROBERT LOWIE, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 223 (1947).

118

Residual instances of using sounds to communicate legal meaning in our own much less

aurally-oriented society are the striking of a hammer on an auction block to mark a sale and the
striking of a judge's gavel on the bench when a court is recessed or adjourned.
"' For a discussion of the primacy of vision in present-day Western society, see Stephen A.
Tyler, The Vision Quest in the West, Or What the Mind's Eye Sees, 40 J. OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL
RES. 23 (1984). On the significance of visual perception in the writing cultures of fourth century B.C.
Greece and the late Roman Empire respectively, see THORLIEF BOMAN, HEBREW THOUGHT COMPARED WITH GREEK 113-16 (1960); R.F. Newbold, Centre, Periphery and Eye in the Late Roman
Empire, 3 FLORILEGIUM 72 (1981). For analogous discussions of the heightened importance of visual
expression and experience in the later Middle Ages, see HUIZINGA,supra note 67, at 200-14, 269-73;
MARGARET MILES, IMAGE AS INSIGHT: VISUAL UNDERSTANDING IN WESTERN CHRISTIANITY AND

SECULAR CULTURE 64-75 (1985); Jeffrey Hamburger, The Visual and the Visionary: The Image in
Late Medieval Monastic Devotions, 20 VIATOR 161 (1989); Heather Phillips, John Wyclif's De
Eucharistiain Its Medieval Setting 123-202 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Toronto).
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To this might be added "seeing is believing," "I know it when I see it,"
and "what you see is what you get."' 120 Our opinion frequently is our

"point of view." We conceive of knowledge as "enlightenment." We call
intelligent people "bright" and deride the not-so-bright as "dimwits. 121
In preliterate or marginally literate societies, this obsession with the
visual dimension of experience is absent. In the African Hausa language,
for instance, the verb "to see" (gani) is virtually never used to communicate understanding.1 22 In a cultural environment that is not dependent
upon reading and writing, the sensory focus is elsewhere. As the Hausa
proverb says, "seeing is not eating.11 23 Some performance cultures are

even suspicious of vision. In Suya Indian society, the eye is "the locus of
the dangerous and anti-social," 2 and persons of extraordinary vision are
feared as witches.12 5 Perhaps it is because of this somewhat negative attitude to seeing that so many wise or knowing men are depicted in
performative myth and tradition as being or becoming blind.126 In early
Greek culture, Homer, Oedipus, and the prophet Tireseus were all reputed either to have been blind from birth or to have lost their sight at a
moment of personal truth. 27 In Norse mythology, Odin likewise gave up
his left eye in exchange for wisdom. 2
Performative visual expression differs from visual expression in writing
120 See generally Alan Dundes, Seeing is Believing, 81 NAT. HIsT. 8 (1978).
121 For a more extended consideration of modem visual metaphors for knowledge and thinking,

see Walter J. Ong, "I See What You Say": Sense Analogues for Intellect, in INTERFACES OF THE
WORD: STUDIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE 121-44 (1977).
122 Ian Ritchie, The Fusion of the Faculties:A Study of the Language of the Senses in Hausaland, in VARIETIES, supra note 17, at 196.
123 Id. (quoting C.E. WHITTING, HAUSA AND FULANI PROVERBS 52 (1940)). Genesis 1:3 may
reflect an analogous sensory subordination of seeing in its story that the word was prior to the light in
the order of creation. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
'' Seeger, supra note 43, at 215.
'22 Id. at 216; see also THE EVIL EYE: A FOLKLORE CASEBOOK (Alan Dundes ed., 1981). It
may be significant that in the last two hundred years, as writing has become universalized in Western
society, evil has increasingly become identified not with those who see, but with those who cannot
see-a trend that arguably represents the moral dimension of sight's primacy in our own sensory
hierarchy. On the recent association of blindness and evil, see MICHAEL E. MONBECK, THE MEANING OF BLINDNESS: ATTITUDES TOWARDS BLINDNESS AND BLIND PEOPLE 56-58 (1973).
120 Seeger, supra note 43, at 222.
On the correlation between blindness and wisdom in Greek culture, see William Super, Sight

and Seeing in Ancient Times, 70
218 H.R. DAVIDSON,

POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 413, 423 (1907).
GODS AND MYTHS OF NORTHERN EUROPE 26 (1964). My thanks to

Spencer Clough for drawing this story to my attention.
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cultures not only in having less stature, but also in having different form.
First, most performative visual expression is nontextual. Little if any information is communicated through the visual depiction of words. Second,
visual information in performance cultures tends to be three-dimensional
and kinetic rather than two-dimensional and static; the use of writing has
not yet accustomed performative individuals to expressing themselves on
immobile, flat surfaces.129
The most common type of three-dimensional kinetic visual expression
in any performance culture is gesture-expressive movements of the whole
body, the head, the limbs, or the hand. Gestures may be both natural
(instinctive) and conventional (cultural). In both forms, they can communicate many emotions and experiences. Stretching out the arms may express welcome; kneeling may express submission; offering or giving a gift
may express friendship. Linking a number of gestures in series creates
ceremony. Accelerating their rate of execution creates dance.
129 The dominance of kinetic over static visual expression in performance cultures means that

members of such cultures tend to place less emphasis on elements of visual communication that are
more effective in a predominantly static visual environment. Color is the most obvious of these. In
kinetic visual communication, color tends to be secondary to the communication of visual action. Only
when something is immobile can its coloring be fully appreciated; when something is still, color may
indeed be necessary to communicate what action cannot. Members of performance cultures are certainly capable of seeing as many colors as we are, and they are not averse to using colors in costume
and art. Their color schemes nonetheless tend to be less elaborate than our own, and their languages
contain only a few "color" words. For example, Homeric Greek contained no words for "color" at all.
Different colors were understood by reference to light intensity (which arguably stands out more in a
moving object). Green or yellow was denoted by choros, meaning "pale." Red or purple was denoted
by phoinix, meaning "bright." Navy blue or iron grey was denoted by huakinthos, meaning "dark."
Early Hebrew culture also was uninterested in color. On the few occasions when the Old Testament
mentions rainbows, it notes them more for their brilliance and splendor than for their shadings. Light
is consistently more important than hue. Anglo-Saxon society shared the same attitude. Beowuif has
notably been described as "a poem of bright day and darkest night, light ale-hall and gloomy wasteland." In a similar vein, the scribes and decorators of early medieval manuscripts were as much, if not
more, interested in making their works shine by the copious use of reflective gold and silver leaf as
they were in using flat colors. They were literally "illuminators," not just "illustrators." Members of
many traditional African societies still seem more concerned with brightness or darkness than "color"
per se. The Shona language, for instance, contains only three specific color words. See BERNHARD
BISCHOFF, LATIN PALEOGRAPHY: ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES 16-18 (1990); BOMAN, supra
note 119, at 88; 3 WILLIAM E. GLADSTONE, STUDIES ON HOMER 456-96 (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1858); GEOFFREY GORER, AFRICA DANCES: A BOOK ABOUT WEST AFRICA NEGROES 299

(1935); ELEANOR IRWIN, COLOUR TERMS IN GREEK POETRY (1974); OTTO LOWENSTEIN, THE
SENSES 80 (1966); Nigel F. Barley, Old English Colour Classification: Where do Matters Stand?, 3
ANGLO-SAXON ENG. 15, 15 (1974); Ian Ritchie, Hausa Sensory Symbolism, 32 ANTHROPOLOGICA
113, 114 (1990).
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Obviously, gestures are not alien to writing cultures. Members of writing cultures are nonetheless likely to demean them as not being carriers of
serious information, and individuals in such societies may even constrain
their use in conversation. In this context, it is clear that the predominant
"visualism" of writing cultures, as a byproduct of writing, does not favor
all visual media equally. The sixteenth century Protestant assault on liturgical gesture is too well known to need recounting here. 130 In mideighteenth century England, Samuel Johnson's aversion to gesticulating in
company was so strong that when one of his interlocutors (presumably
someone less writing-oriented than the famous lexicographer) sought to
"giv[e] additional force to what he uttered, by expressive movements of his
hands, Johnson fairly seized them, and held them down.""' By 1878, the
anthropologist E.B. Tylor felt able to suggest (albeit in a somewhat jingoistic tone) that:
We English are perhaps poorer in the gesture-language than any
other people in the world. We use a form of words to denote what a
gesture ... would express. Perhaps it is because we read and write
so much, and have come to think and talk as we should write, and
so let fall those aids to speech which cannot be carried into the writ13 2
ten language.
In performance cultures, by contrast, gestures literally occupy center
stage. Western scholars observing native poets in Niger and other areas of
Africa have noted the frequent use of gestures in the recitation of traditional tales and songs. 3 Their photographs reveal that these gestures are
"' See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Even before the sixteenth century, Europeans' discomfort with expansive types of liturgical gesture was reflected in a new physical attitude of prayer.
While early medieval manuscripts show supplicants raising their arms, manuscripts from the more
literate fourteenth and fifteenth centuries depict praying individuals in a spatially confined, "modern"
pose with their hands clasped close to their bodies. Saenger, supra note 34, at 152.
... JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF JOHNSON 323 (Christopher Hibbert ed., 1979).
1"2 EDWARD B. TYLOR, RESEARCHES INTO THE EARLY HISTORY OF MANKIND 44 (Paul
Bohannan ed., University of Chicago Press 1964) (1878). The apparently greater tendency among
members of Continental European societies (especially the French and the Italians) to use more and/
or more expansive gestures in everyday communication may reflect the greater tenacity of nonwritten
forms of expression in the writing cultures of predominantly Catholic countries. See supra note 22
and accompanying tex:t.
...Genevieve Calame-Griaule, Le Gestuelle des Conteurs: Etat d'une Recherche, in ORALITA:
CULTURA, LETrERATURA, DiscoRso (Bruno Gentili ed., 1985).
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hardly incidental or subtle visual asides:"" African storytellers actually
13 5
stand up, move around, and sometimes even mime their narratives.
Gestures play a similarly striking role in everyday conversation. Thus, a
French anthropologist has noted that among the west African Bambara
people,
while a man talks, his hands react like antennae trying to direct the
speech or to encircle it to put it where it is necessary ....

They

follow closely the intonations of the voice, the affirmation, the interrogation, and the exclamations. Defenses and desires pass through
them, as if the verb becomes more efficacious when carried by the
ends of the fingers.1 3 '
The prominence that gesture enjoys in African performance cultures is
reminiscent of its historical role in several preliterate and marginally literate European societies. For instance, judging from the art and literature
that has survived them, the preclassical Greeks were highly gestural. On
one archaic Greek vase, a woman touches her head to express mourning;
on another, an old man touches the chin of a warrior brandishing a sword
and thereby pleads for his life.137 In the Iliad, Homer's heroes routinely
communicate their elite status to onlookers by taking long strides into battle. Thus, Ajax at one point rushes forward "with a smile on his grim
face, and with his feet below he went with long strides, brandishing his
far-shadowing lance." On another occasion, "the Trojans pressed forward
together and Hector led them on with long strides." ' 8 In the same poem,
the great god Zeus gives his assent to a supplicant's request not by words,
but by the more powerful gesture of bowing his head: "For this among
the immortal gods is the mightiest witness I can give, and nothing I do
shall be vain nor revocable nor a thing unfulfilled when I bend my head
...See, e.g., Scheub, supra note 16, at 355-60; Calame-Griaule, supra note 133, at 304-05
(photographs).
..
5 JAN VANSINA, ORAL TRADITION As HISTORY 34 (1985).
... SUZANNE P. BLIER, GESTURES IN AFRICAN ART 22 (1982) (quoting Dominique Zahan).
137 JEFFREY HURWIT, THE ART AND CULTURE OF EARLY GREECE, 1100-480 B.C. 25-26
(1985). For a literary instance of the pleading gesture (suggesting that this was not simply artistic
convention), see THE ILIAD OF HOMER 1.500-.501 (Richmond A. Lattimore trans., 1951) [hereinafter
THE ILIAD].
'38 Jan Bremer, Walking, Standing and Sitting in Ancient Greek Culture, in A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF GESTURE, supra note 5, at 17 (quoting THE ILIAD, supra note 137, at 7.211-.214,

15.306-.307).
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in assent to it."' 13 9
Medieval civilization was similarly accustomed to gestural communication. As historian Jacques Le Goff has so eloquently and persuasively
noted,
Gestures had meaning and committed people ....

Signs of the cross

were gestures of faith; joined hands, raised hands, hands outstretched in a cross, veiled hands were gestures of prayer. Beating
one's breast was a gesture of penitence. The laying on of hands and
signs of the cross were gestures of benediction. Censing was a gesture of exorcism. The ministration of sacraments culminated in a
few gestures. The celebration of mass was a series of gestures. The
pie-eminent literary genre of feudal society was the chanson de
geste .... 140
Again, contemporary gestural practices were reflected in art. One of the
most common subjects in medieval painting and illumination is the figure
of Christ raising his hand, keeping the index and middle fingers straight
and the ring and little fingers bent in a very precise sign of benediction.
Other figures use their hands or arms to beckon, admonish, express resignation,, or proclaim victory.' 4 2 Ultimately, such gestures "gave [medieval

art] life, made it expressive, and gave it a sense of line and movement."'1 43
2.

The Sight of Law

In keeping with its overall communicative environment, performative
law has significant visual aspects, even if its visualism is not as all-embracing as that of law in our own writing culture. Performative law further reflects its cultural norms in preferring kinetic over static visual
forms. In the absence or social insignificance of writing, its visual
messages are primarily passed in gesture and ceremony. As the great English legal historian Frederic Maitland once commented, "So long as law
is unwritten, it must be dramatized and acted. Justice must assume a pic...THE ILIAD, supra note 137, at 1.525-.527.
140 JACQUES LE GOFF, MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION: 400-1500, at 357 (Julia Barrow trans.,
1988).
141 MOSHE BARASCH, GIOTTO AND THE LANGUAGE OF GESTURE 19 (1987).
142 Id. passim.
"4

LE GOFF, supra note 140, at 357.
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turesque garb or she will not be seen. ' 144 In our modern writing culture
we have almost entirely "lost sight" of this kind of visual legal expression.
One historian of gesture recently admitted, "We would scarcely imagine
today that a simple gesture could possess legal power or could commit
people more efficiently than a written form drawn up by a notary and
signed by both parties.' 145 We therefore need to be reminded of the legal
role visual signs had (and have) in performance cultures, and how those
signs appear to observers.

44 HAROLD

J.

BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL

TRADITION 58 (1983) (quoting Frederic Maitland).

"' Jean-Claude Schmitt, The Rationale of Gestures in the West: Third to Thirteenth Centuries,
in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GESTURE, supra note 5, at 59. This attitude has unfortunately encouraged scholars and publishers to exclude manuscript depictions of legal gestures from their modern
print redactions of such early medieval works as Beaumanoir, Coutumes du Beauvaisis; Bracton, On
the Laws and Customs of England; Gratian, Decretum. Our understanding of the place of gesture in
early medieval law (and, perhaps, in performative law in general) would arguably be very different if
the "primary sources" on which we rely did not whitewash the visual record in this fashion. A book
that attempts to compensate for this unfortunate practice is ANTHONY MELNIKAS, THE CORPUS OF
THE MINIATURES IN THE MANUSCRIPTS OF DECRETUM GRATIANII (1975).
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FIGURE 2. Homage. The vassal pays homage to his feudal lord by kneeling before him and
raising his clasped hands so that the lord can close his own hands over them in a visual (and tactile)
signal of authority and association. This ceremony was already hundreds of years old when it was
depicted in this drawing from the Dresden Manuscript of the thirteenth century Sachsenspiegal.

In many performance cultures, visual signs communicate the creation of
legal relationships. In ancient Mesopotamian law, for instance, a dying
man wishing to designate an heir or legatee took that person by the
hand. 4 ' Among the Dusun people of contemporary Borneo, a deathbed
donor of property awards his legacy in a similar visual fashion. 11 7 In early
medieval Europe, a vassal's placing of his folded hands within the hands
of his lord was a visual sign of his submission to feudal authority (see
Figure 2). a4' A medieval marriage routinely involved a joining of right
hands. In thirteenth century France, a priest joined the hands of the bride
and groom (see Figure 3).149 In northern England and Scotland, the tradi146 A. LEO OPPENHEIM, ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA: PORTRAIT OF A DEAD CIVILIZATION 283
(1964).
...Thomas R. Williams, CulturalStucturing of Tactile Experience in a Borneo Society, 68 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 27, 34 (1968).
"
FRAN(OIS L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 67 (1961).
149 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE II: REVELATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 130 (George
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tional "handfast" was between the groom and the father of the bride (for
a depiction of an analogous legal gesture from early medieval Spain also
implicating a transfer of land, see Figure 4).15'

FIGURE 3. Marriage. In this miniature from a medieval French manuscript of the Decretum, a
priest joins the hands of bride and groom as he blesses their union.

Duby ed. & Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1988).
10 BETTY J. BAUML & FRANZ BAUML, A

DICTIONARY OF GESTURES

122 (1975).

[Vol. 41
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FIGURE 4. Marriage and Transmission of Feudal Rights. In this illustration from a thirteenth
century Catalan mansucript known as the Liber Feudorum Maior, a father conveys ownership of
land to his daughter and son-in-law on the occasion of their marriage.

Many legal relationships are premised upon agreement; it is therefore
not surprising that gestures signaling agreement should resemble those
signaling relationship. In early medieval Welsh, English, French, and
Spanish law, a handclasp indicated the making of a contract.' Alterna...On the handclasp in early English medieval law, see 2

BOROUGH CUSTOMS

lxxx (Mary

Bateson ed., Selden Society 21 (1906)). On Spanish and French practices, see David Ihbetson, Sale of
Goods in the Fourteenth Century, 107 LAW Q. REV. 480, 483, 486 (1991). On the Welsh handclasp,
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tively, early medieval Germans making an agreement could lay the palms
of their hands together as they held them over their heads (presumably to
maximize visibility).1 52 Saxon practice permitted a raising of the hands,
with two or four fingers extended, without actual touching. 151 In some
African societies, buyer and seller communicate agreement by "waving
their right hands up and down and then touching each other's palms with
the fingers stretched away. "154
Performative agreements and contracts may also be communicated by
visible delivery or acceptance of some (frequently personal) item in a
pledge of alliance, agreement, or performance. Of course, a material cipher is not necessary if the object of a transaction is handy and can be
passed and received. If that object is not handy, or if the agreement does
not require or involve transfer of goods, the use of a suitable symbol may
be convenient to visually mark the transaction. A Mesopotamian debtor
could seal a loan agreement by publicly delivering his garment (or, according to some sources, the hem of his garment) to his creditor.15 In the
early Middle Ages, straws, gloves, arrows, and staffs were popular for
similar purposes of pledge.' In southern France and Italy, the gift of
"God's penny"-a small coin-was a popular medieval mark of accord
between buyer and seller.1 57 In Ghanian society, it is still important to
1 58
transfer some material token to "stamp" or "seal" a bargain visually.
In African Shona law, a prospective groom must offer the family of the
prospective bride a "proposal token" (traditonally a hoe, bracelet, or anklet); acceptance of this token communicates the family's agreement to the
proposal.1 59
Members of performance cultures may conversely communicate the dissolution or destruction of legal relationships and accords by visual means.
see 2

THOMAS P. ELLIS, WELSH TRIBAL LAW AND CUSTOM IN THE MIDDLE AGES 4
152 RUDOLPH HUEBNER, A HISTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW 495 (1918).

153

Id.

'e
"5

DOOB, supra note 64, at 70.

(1926).

Meir Malul, Studies in Legal Symbolic Acts in Mesopotamian Law 366 (1983) (unpublished

Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
156 Henry C. Lodge, The Anglo-Saxon Land Law, in ESSAYS

IN ANGLO-SAXON LAW

190 (Bos-

ton, Little, Brown and Co. 1876).
117 Ibbetson, supra note 151, at 484.
158 A.N. Allott, Evidence in African Customary Law, in 1

READINGS IN AFRICAN

LAW 85

(Eugene Cotran & N.N. Rubin eds., 1970).
159 Id. at 86.
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The Mesopotamian son who wished legally to disown his parents abandoned his garment at the entrance of his former home. The Mesopotamian father who wished to disown his son broke a clod of earth between
his fingers.1 60 A Mesopotamian slave owner seeking to free a slave
smashed the slave's ceramic pot (presumably by dropping it on the floor
or dashing it against a wall)."6 Among the Salian Franks, an individual's
legal abandonment of his family could be visually announced by breaking
four staffs and throwing them to the four corners of his house.16 2 The late
twelfth century chanson de geste known as Raoul de Cambrai describes a
breaking of feudal homage in similarly visual terms: an estranged vassal
took "three hairs from the ermine he ha[d] on, pulling them through the
links of his burnished hauberk, and hurled them at Raoul. ' 16 3 An early
thirteenth century text depicts essentially the same procedure in a story
that describes a young knight denying his homage to God "by throwing
straw with his hand. 16 4 Contemporary manuscripts routinely depicted
the dissolution of a marriage as a physical, visual separation of husband
and wife by a judge or bishop (see Figure 5). In traditional South African
black communities, a husband who wishes to divorce his wife presents her
with a small coin or other object which visually indicates his wish to have
nothing more to do with her.1 6

0 Malul, supra note 155, at 110, 138.
2o Id. at 58-59. The sounds accompanying these actions may not have been altogether incidental. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
162 LE GOFF, supra note 30, at 268.
161 RAOUL DE CAMBRAI vv. 2131-2135 (Sarah Kay ed. and trans., 1992).
I64 LE GOFF, stpra note 30,
at 247 (quoting Caesarius of Heisterbach, DIALOGUS
MIRACULORUM (C. 1220)).
ll J.F. HOLLEMAN, ISSUES IN AFRICAN LAW 9 (1974).
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FIGURE 5. Annulment of Marriage. In this miniature from a thirteenth century copy of the
Decretum, a bishop physically separates a man from his wife.

In performance cultures, visual gestures, acts, and ceremonies also publicize legal claims to property, especially land. In ancient Jewish law, for
example, a land-claimant had to perform a visible hazakah act, generally
considered to be "locking, fencing ...[or] effecting ...an opening [in the
property]."' 66 In early Icelandic law, a land-claimant had to spend a day
on the land from sunrise to sunset, walking around and lighting fires on
"'

1 ISSAc HERZOG, THE MAIN INSTITUTIONS

OF JEWISH LAW 155 (1965).
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the tract at prescribed distances. 167 In early medieval French law, the
land-claimant had a variety of options. He could make a formal entrance
onto the property on horseback or in a cart; he could make symbolic use
of the land by cutting some turf and twigs from it; he could welcome
guests to it; or he could sit down in a chair set upon it.' 6 8 Early Irish law
'obliged a claimant to make three separate entries on disputed land: the
first time with two horses and a witness; the second with four horses and
two witnesses; and the third with eight horses and three witnesses. If no
one objected to this high-visibility procedure, the claimant acquired ownership of the land. The claimant then had to demonstrate his right to the
community at large by spending the night on the property, kindling a fire,
and tending to animals. 89
Property rights may also be visibly abandoned or terminated in performance cultures. An Anglo-Saxon landowner could legally quit his estate by jumping or climbing over a hedge. 7 0 A similar practice existed
among the Salian Franks 17 ' and may even have existed in ancient Mesopotamian jurisprudence. 7 2 In medieval German law, the creditor of an
insolvent debtor could signal the debtor's forthcoming eviction from his
house or land by setting the debtor's stool or chair before the debtor's
73
door.'
Performative gestures and visual actions can additionally communicate
formal conveyances. In ancient Mesopotamian law, a vendor could transfer land to a purchaser by lifting his own foot off it and putting the purA.J. GUREVICH, CATEGORIES OF MEDIEVAL CULTURE 236 (G.L. Campbell trans., 1984).
168 BRISSAUD, supra note 115, at 373. On the German application of this last custom, see CRIM107

INAL JUSTICE THROUGH THE AGES, at 312 (John Fosberry trans., 1981) [hereinafter CRIMINAL

JUSTICE]. The German verb sitzen, "to sit" is linguistically related to the term "seisin," which is so
important in early English land law. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 30 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1898). Visual acts of possession in Germanic law may also have included drawing water from the property, ploughing a short
furrow through it, or taking a tile from the roof of any building on it. CARLO CALISSE, A HISTORY
OF ITALIAN LAW 707 (1928).
1"9 FERGUS KELLY, A GUIDE TO EARLY IRISH LAW 186-87 (1988). Compare this practice with
the Icelandic claim-practice described earlier. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.

170 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 168, at 85.

171 HUEBNER, supra note 152, at 243.
172

YOCHANAN

MUFFS, STUDIES IN THE ARAMAIC LEGAL PAPYRI FROM ELEPHANTINE 101

(1973).
173 CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

supra note 168, at 312.
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chaser's foot in his place."7 4 This physically demonstrated the cessation of
the old owner's control over the property and the commencement of control by a new owner. The Old Testament tells us that in ancient Israel, a
land transfer could be similarly communicated by the vendor passing a
sandal to the purchaser, metaphorically giving the latter the right to walk
over (to possess) the property.175 Early Greek, Roman, German, and English law recognized handing over a clod of earth as a sign of conveyance. 176 Subtle variants of this gesture involved certain items either taken
from the land (sticks, grass, or straw) or representing power over the land
(an arrow or glove, see Figure 6). 177 In one eleventh century French cartulary, gifts of land to a chapter house are recorded as having been made
per baculum (a staff), per clochear de turribulo (a censer bell, which
may additionally have been shaken and rung in the process of transfer),
per cultellum (a knife), per candalabrum (a candlestick), per denarium
(a penny), perfurcam (a fork), and per malleolum (a hammer). 17 8 In the
thirteenth century, Bracton recorded that in England, livery of seisin for a
house "ought to be made by the door and its hasp and key.' 1 79 In every
one of these cases, it was contemplated that the object transfered would
survive as a visual reminder of conveyance. Thus, an English chronicler
writing circa 1100 noted that a cup given to Durham Cathedral on the
occasion of a gift of land "is preserved in the church and retains the mem' °
ory of that deed for ever. "1
174

MUFFS,

supra note 172, at 21; see also Malul, supra note 155, at 514.

175 Ruth 4:7. I am indebted to Rev. Dr. John B. Hibbitts for drawing this reference to my

attention.
176 On early Greek law, see Louis

GERNET, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ANCIENT GREECE 166
(John Hamilton & Blaise Nagy trans., 1981). On early Roman law, see THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS
4.17 (Francis de Zulueta trans., 1946) [hereinafter INSTITUTES]. Although Gaius wrote his Institutes
in the second century A.D., he took a special delight in recording the details of many ancient legal
practices that barely survived in his own time, if at all. On early German law, see MUNROE SMITH,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN LAW 59 (1928). On eorly English (Anglo-Saxon) law, see POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 168, at 87.
177 BRISSAUD, supra note 115, at 369-70.
178

STEPHEN ]). WHITE, CUSTOM, KINSHIP, AND GIFTS TO SAINTS: THE LAUDATIO PAREN-

FRANCE, 1050-1150, at 249 n.101 (1988). The same record also notes transfers
per cartam (charter), in which a writing appears physically to have taken the place of a more traditional object. Given this, it is noteworthy that at an early stage, instead of obviating the gestural
ceremony of transfer, writing merely became part of it. See MEMORY, supra note 2, at 207-08.
179 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 125 (George E. Woodbine ed.,
TUM IN WESTERN

Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1977).
'"
MEMORY, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting SIMEON
OMNIA,

in ROLL

SERIES

OF DURHAM, SYMEONIS MONACHI OPERA

LXXV 97 (T. Arnold ed., n.p. 1882)).
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FIGURE 6. Conveying Land. In this illustration from the Heidelberg Manuscript of the Sachsenspiegel, an erstwhile landholder conveys a fief (indicated by the grain to which he points) by
handing a glove to his overlord. The fork around the landholder's neck symbolically indicates that this
is an expropriation.

Besides communicating the fact of conveyance, visual gestures and acts
may indicate to members of performance cultures the extent of property
being conveyed. Boundaries can be pointed out to witnesses; larger
properties may actually be perambulated. Both of these techniques appear
to have been employed in early medieval European law, although there is
some dispute as to their continued popularity once written charters regu-
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larly recorded elaborate land descriptions.1 8s The record of one eleventh
century Norman conveyance'nonetheless refers to the conveyed property
as "three gardens in front of the same Monville, as was shown from the
public road to the brook.118 2 Another charter indicates that the grantor of
property "demonstrated the measurements and boundaries by showing
[them] to Prior Geoffrey and Ernuceus the monk.11 83 In Africa, convey-

ances may similarly include a visual demonstration of limits. Among the
Kamba people, for instance, conveyancing involves pointing out boundaries, generally in the form of straight lines between such permanent or
18 4
semi-permanent natural objects as large trees, stones, or ant hills.
In performance cultures, visual communication of legal meaning is not,
however, confined to simple transactions between individuals. Litigants
and witnesses in performative disputes use visual cues, gestures, and
movements to communicate their positions, their stories, their wishes, and
their reactions. Few of these actions survive in the judicial routine of modern writing cultures (one exception is our habit of raising the right hand
to take an oath). Instead, our primary memory of the visual aspect of
performative procedure is metaphorical: in proposing something to a
court, a litigant or lawyer still "makes a motion."
In performance-based legal systems, motions are visually concrete. In
early Roman law, each party making a claim to an item of personal property would place a hand (or a staff) on it, in turn, to indicate his position.
The judge would then intervene and decide the matter (legis actio per
sacramentum in rem).1 8 5 If the dispute were over land, the parties had to
bring a clod of earth into court in order to make their claims.' In early
medieval German law (if we believe the fourteenth century illuminators of
the early thirteenth century German legal manuscript called the Sachsen101

See EMILY Z. TABUTEAU, TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY IN ELEVENTH CENTURY NORMAN

LAW 132 (1988). For an explanation of how the growth of complex written charters made physically
pointing out boundaries superfluous, see Samuel E. Thorne, Livery of Seisin, 52 LAW Q. REV. 345,

348-50 (1936).
82TABUTEAU, supra note 181, at 131 (quoting a charter from La TrinitE du Mont, dated to
between 1030 and 1035).
"8IId. at 132 (quoting a charter from the Livre blanc of Saint Martin de Sees, folio 55v-56r,
dated to 1099) (alteration in TABUTEAU).
584

H.E. Lambert, Land Tenure Among the Kamba, 6 AFR. STUD. 157, 171 (1947).

185

SEAGLE, supra note 108, at 94.

"" Geoffrey MacCormack, Formalism, Symbolism and Magic in Early Roman Law, 37 TUDSCHRIFT VOOR REcHTSGESCHIEDENIS 439, 448 (1969).
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spiegel, or "Mirror of the Saxons"),18 7 a witness could indicate his support of a party by grasping that party's arm or shoulder. By crossing his
hands, a witness indicated a refusal (or an incapacity) to give evidence or
swear (see Figure 7). In thirteenth century England, a litigant could avow
the right of another person to plead for him by raising his hand and that
of his "attorney" together. A variant of this gesture involved the designated pleader holding up his hand in the other party's direction as if to
swear. His client would then place his hand on the pleader's hand. 88

107There has'been a good deal of debate about whether the Sachsenspiegel illuminations depict
legal gestures that were in actual use, or whether the illuminations were merely designed to visually
represent transactions that relied on other media. This question, which of course can be extended to
include the illuminations and miniatures in most medieval legal manuscripts, is as yet unresolved.
Considering what we know generally about the medieval affiliation for gesture, I am nonetheless
inclined to believe that the illuminators of the Sachsenspiegel and the other manuscripts correctly
captured the importance of gesture in medieval legal communication, although occasionally they may
have contrived, distorted, or exaggerated specific gestures or actions for visual effect. As Moshe
Barasch has noted,
the depiction of legal gesture-whether or not [the illuminators] were faithful to actual
reality-attests to a full awareness of gesture as a symbolic form. Whether or not the judge
in court, when performing a divorce, actually pushed husband and wife apart . . . the
public in the thirteenth century obviously believed that this was what happened in court,
and that this gesture was part and parcel of the legal procedure itself.... Did everybody
who declared in court his refusal to do something actually grasp his right hand with his
left, immobilizing the hand that does the job, and thus manifesting his inability to act? A
modem reader may doubt it. Yet, obviously this is how such actions were imagined in the
Middle Ages.
BARASCH, supra note 141, at 6-7. Given the highly public (even open-air) nature of many legal
proceedings in the early Middle Ages, it stands to reason that the manner in which legal procedures
were imagined at that time basically reflected what they looked like. On the Sachsenspiegel illuminations, see KARL VON AMIRA, DIE DRESDENER BILDERHANDSCHRIFT DES SACHSENSPIEGELS (1902);
Gerald H. Shinn, The EschatologicalFunction of the Iconographyin the DresdenManuscript of the
Sachsenspiegel, in CONTEMPORARY REFLECTIONS ON THE MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN TRADITION 53
(George H. Shriver ed., 1974); Malcolm Letts, The Sachsenspiegel and its Illustrators,49 LEGAL Q.
REV. 555 (1933). For a further discussion of the evidentiary value of the illustrations in medieval
legal manuscripts as a whole, see Gemot Kocher, Sachsenspiegal, Institutionen, Digesten, CodexZum Aussagewert mittelalterlicher Rechtsillustrationen, 3 FORSCHUNGEN ZUR RECHTSARCHAOLOGIE UND RECHTSLICHEN VOLKSKUNDE 5 (1981).

I"
(1982).

ROBERT C. PALMER, THE COUNTY COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND:

1150-1350, at 92
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FIGURE 7. Refusing to Act. In this drawing from the Dresden Manuscript of the Sachenspiegel, litigants or witnesses signal their refusal to act (perhaps their refusal to swear) by crossing
their hands.

Where there are no witnesses to an act, or where an accused person is
not deemed worthy to swear an oath, some performance cultures may demand that the accused perform some dangerous, visible gesture to communicate guilt or innocence. In early medieval Europe, for example, accused
persons were often asked to carry a hot iron several paces. Providing the
iron was not dropped, a finding of guilt depended on whether the burn
festered. Alternatively, an accused might be ordered to retrieve a stone
from a cauldron of hot water; again, any subsequent sign of infection was
taken as a sign of guilt.' Similar feats are sometimes demanded of accused individuals in indigenous African societies.' 90
Unlike the other legal gestures considered in this section, the ordeal is
not (at least in theory) a voluntary visual communication of meaning from
one human person to another. Rather, the ordeal provides a sign of the
'19 On medieval ordeals generally, see ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL By FIRE AND WATER: THE
MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL (1986). On medieval ordeals as a collection of "dramatic and memora-

ble gestures," see Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural:A Medieval Change, 104 DAEDALUS
133, 138 (1975).
"I On African ordeals, see, e.g., BARRIE REYNOLDS, MAGIC, DIVINATION AND WITCHCRAFT
AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1963).
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will of God (or of spirits) revealed to the community through the gestures
of an individual whose actions are, for this purpose, divinely determined.
Traditionally, most scholars have emphasized the "strangeness" or "irrationality" of this kind of divine adjudication; it is perhaps just as significant, however, that societies whose members communicate with gestures
equally expect that God or other spiritual agents will use gestures (or
their physical byproducts) to communicate with them. To this extent, the
decline of the ordeal in later medieval Europe (and its retreat in contemporary Africa) may be partially explained not only by concerns about the
rationality or theological propriety of asking God to intercede in human
disputes, but also by the general decline in the social and intellectual status of gesture that accompanies a significant rise in cultural literacy.
C.

Tactile Communication and Legal Expression
1. The Cultural Significance of Touch

Having considered the role of aural and visual media in performative
communication and legal expression, we now move into the less familiar
territory of tactile communication. The reader may understandably feel
some unease at this juncture. Most members of modern writing cultures
are even more suspicious of touch as a carrier of important information
than they are of sound or gesture. We have largely struck touch from our
cultural canon. 9 It is noteworthy that the original English form of the
contemporary visual idiom "seeing is believing" seems to have been "seeing is believing, but feeling's the truth."1 2 The new form suggests that
sight has displaced touch as a preferred arbiter of knowledge. 9 From a
slightly different perspective, a person considered "touchy" in our society
is not as respected or admired as the "seer" or "visionary." Indeed, people
do not like to have the touchy person around.""
Such attitudes are alien to most performance cultures. Their members
live and think in a highly tactile universe. The Hellenic Greeks, for instance, considered geometry to be about "the way the various shapes felt
"' See generally Frances
CRITICISM 199 (1949).

W. Herring, Touch-The Neglecded Sense, 7 J. AsTrHFiCs & ART

192

Dundes, supra note 120, at 11.

193

Id.

294

Id.
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(they tended to imagine themselves fingering their way around a geometric figure), whereas modern geometricians think more about the way the
various shapes look."19 Touch likewise dominated the perceptions of
early medieval Europeans.' 9 6 In discussing the various human senses in
his commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, St. Thomas Aquinas gave touch
the most attention: it was the most fundamental sense, and functioned as a
mirror of the mind. Aquinas believed that a light touch denoted intelligence and nobility of nature, while a heavy touch communicated the opposite qualities. 9 The concept of touching was so powerful that it served as
a basis for other senses. Even seeing was understood as a form of touching, either of the eyes by rays emitted from objects ("intromission" theory), or of objects by rays sent forth from the eyes ("extramission"
theory)."'
The prevalence of touching as a legitimate medium of telling-and
knowing-in performance-based societies has been frequently noted by
outsiders from less tactile writing cultures. In 1913, for instance, the head
of a Norwegian expedition to the Arctic reported that in his first contact
with Eskimos, "Little children jumped up so as to be able to touch our
shoulders and men and women stroked and handled us in a very friendly
way." 19 9 Touching nonetheless transcends performative greeting rituals.
Two North or West Africans may hold hands or otherwise continue physical contact throughout an encounter or conversation. As a general matter,
Arms are continually reaching out to encircle children and to press
them hard against an adult's body. . . .Men and women sit and
walk with their arms round one another's shoulders.... [T]he con-

tinual attempt to make physical contact-to touch, to hold or to caress . . .- is one of the most noticeable elements in inter-personal

relationships.200

In writing societies, such habits are likely to be regarded either as vulgar
195 Walter J. Ong, The Shifting Sensorium, in VARIETIES, supra note 17, at 27.
,91LE GOFF, supra note 140, at 339.

the attitudes of Thomas Aquinas, see Phillips, supra note 119, at 131.
19sDAVID CHIDESTER, WORD AND LIGHT: SEEING, HEARING AND RELIGIOUS
(1992).
197 On

DISCOURSE 3-6

233 (1971).
K.E. Read, Morality and the Concept of the Person Among the Gahuku-Gama, 25 OCEANIA

199 ASHLEY MONTAGU, TOUCHING: THE HUMAN SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SKIN
200

233, 268 (1955); see also Kit Griffin, Notes on the Moroccan Sensorium, 32 ANTHROPOLOGICA 107,
109-11 (1990).
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or as breaches of etiquette. For instance, antitactile prejudices were at
least partly responsible for a contemporary English dockworker's comment regarding male workers from far less literate Pakistan: "They're not
natural ...look at the way they hold hands. 2 °1

Even when members of performance cultures are not actually engaged
in tactile contact, they frequently position themselves so as to facilitate
tactile communication.2 °2 Conversations are typically held at close range,
and individuals in groups tend to stand or sit very near each other. People literally wish to "stay in touch" (a modern idiom that may unwittingly recall an ancient cultural habit). As one anthropologist has written
of the Wolof people of Senegal, "close physical proximity [is] ...not only
tolerated but sought out.

' 20 3

To sit or stand at a distance would make no

more sense to a member of such a tactilely oriented society than for a
member of a modern writing culture to stand or sit where eye contact is
awkward. In this context, the pictures that have survived of huddled
groups of early medieval people may not reflect "primitive" or poor living
conditions-or even a certain artistic economy-as much as a natural tendency toward physical proximity among members of a performative soci20 4
ety that still believed in the importance of tactile communication.
Art-forms provide further evidence of the significance of tactile communication and expression in performance-based societies. There, sculpture
and the other plastic arts take cultural priority over drawing and painting.
Anthropologists have indeed discovered that many preliterate societies
"lack any tradition of ... two-dimensional representation. ' 20 5 Of course,
21 MONTAGU, supra note 199, at 339 (quoting THE SPECTATOR, Sept. 5, 1970). One wonders
what the dockworker would have said about his own twelfth century forebearers had he known that
they too had a habit of holding hands, at least while walking. See BAUML & BAUML, supra note 150,
at 140.
On the general study of social distancing, or "proxemics," see EDWARD T. HALL, THE HIDDEN DIMENSION (1966).
20. David Howes, Sensorial Anthropology, in VARIETIES, supra note 17, at 184 (quoting in
translation JACQUELINE RABAIN, L'ENFANT DU LIGNAGE 79 (1979)).
'" Phillips, supra note 119, at 132. On the significance of physical proximity in medieval Anglo-Saxon society in particular, see Redwine, supra note 40, at 71-75.
'*' MERLIN DONALD, ORIGINS OF THE MODERN MIND: THREE STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION
OF CULTURE AND COGNITION

279 (1991); see also RUDOLF

ARNHEM, NEW ESSAYS ON THE PSY-

CHOLOGY OF ART 242 (1986); PAUL S. WINGERT, PRIMITIVE ART: ITS TRADITIONS AND STYLES

13 (1962). The performative priority of tactile over visual expression may even be seen in the twodimensional works that are produced in performance cultures. These works are notoriously "flat,"
lacking any visual perspective that would communicate three-dimensional depth. In other words, their
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three-dimensional sculptures and carvings can be handled as well as
shaped20 6 so as to provide tactile information lacking in "flat" two-dimensional art. Members of performance cultures actually do handle threedimensional art objects: Australian aborigines, for instance, experience the
carvings on wooden and stone churingas not merely by viewing them, but
by touching them and even butting them against their stomachs.20 7 Similarly, early medieval pilgrims touched religious statues and reliquaries, in
many cases wearing them smooth with adoration. As one student of the
early Middle Ages has noted, "the religion of the relic was a tactile religion."20 8 Only in the later medieval period, as writing and literacy became
more common and tactile communication less valued, did the practice of
touching relics and statues decline.2" 9 Since then, Western statuary has
become "painterly."2 10 Informed by visual rather than tactile prejudices, it
has become something to view rather than touch. This purpose is at once
acknowledged and reinforced by the regulations of modern art galleries
and museums.
2.

The Feel of Law

Performance cultures whose members communicate important meanings through touch generally do not hesitate to enlist that medium in support of legal expression. To some extent, the tactile communication of legal meaning may be considered a byproduct of its visual communication.
A legal signal or gesture seen by witnesses may sometimes be directly felt
by the parties themselves. Given that members of performance cultures
are relatively restrained in their enthusiasm for visual expression, however, it seems unlikely that they regard touching in this merely incidental
fashion. Indeed, one suspects that as between seeing and touching, they
(two-dimensional) tactile surface dictates their (two-dimensional) visual form. In Hellenistic Greece
and late medieval Europe, however, the use of optical perspective permitted two-dimensional surfaces
to communicate three-dimensional "reality." Visual form overcame the limitations of its tactile surface, signaling the cultural triumph of visual over tactile perception.
206 Indeed, "the art [objects] of early African cultures, or of the Indians of North, South and
Central America . . . seem to call out irresistibly to be handled." Herring, supra note 191, at 206
(quoting W.R. Valentine).
2o Howes, supra note 44, at 63.
o Phillips, supra note 119, at 37.
269 Stephen Wilson, Introduction to SAINTS AND THEIR CULTS: STUDIES IN RELIGIOUS SocIOLOGY, FOLKLORE AND HISTORY 22 (Stephen Wilson ed., 1983).
210 ROBERT GOLDWATER, PRIMITIVISM IN MODERN ART 35

(1986).
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consider touching to be the primary carrier of legal meaning, at least for
the parties touching or being touched, with the visible gesture being the
byproduct of the transaction.
However characterized, the tactile communication of legal meaning in
performance cultures tends to assume four basic forms. The first of these,
gentle touching, can be either mutual or unilateral. In its mutual variety,
gentle touching involves both parties making active, voluntary physical
contact with one another, thereby communicating agreement or association. The several handclasps and handfasts described earlier 21 perfectly
exemplify this type. The modern handshake may admittedly communicate
similar ideas, but unlike its counterparts in performance cultures, it frequently operates as a mere ceremonial reflection of agreement legally
made and communicated by other means (that is, by writing).
Unilateral gentle touching involves one party making unilateral physical contact either with an object or with a passive person. On many occasions, this communicates the making of a promise to the party represented
by an object, or a promise made in relation to an object. In early Greek
and Roman culture, for example, a legal promise could be made or an
oath could be sworn by touching an altar or other object of religious significance.21 2 Similar practices were common in the early Middle Ages. In
Anglo-Saxon England, for example, Aethelred's Laws mandated that a
witness swearing an oath hold relics in his hand.21 3 In the late eleventh
century, the Bayeux tapestry analogously depicted Harold Godwinson
touching reliquaries, thereby swearing to support the claims of William of
Normandy to the English throne (see Figure 8).214 In a somewhat different context, witnesses of medieval land transactions could endorse a transfer they had heard and seen by touching the charter that sometimes recorded the transfer and their names.2 5 This practice was reflected in the
211See supra notes 146 to 154 and accompanying text (discussing visual signs of performative
vassalage, contract, pledge, and marriage).
.2 See, e.g., BAUML & BAUML, supra note 150, at 152.
"' David W. Rollason, Relic-Cults as an Instrument of Royal Policy, c. 900-c. 1050, 15 ANGLO-SAXON ENG. 91, 97 (1986).
214 DAVID W. ROLLASON, SAINTS AND RELICS IN ANGLO-SAXON

ENGLAND 191-92 (1989).

Compare this practice with the modem, yet archaic, practice of swearing while having one's hand on
the Bible.
"' WHITE, supra note 178, at 32; see also CALISSE, supra note 168, at 706-07. The leading
provision of the eighth-century Bavarian Laws thus demanded that witnesses of property transfers in
favor of the Church "place their hands on the letter [i.e., the charter]." LAWS OF THE ALAMANS AND
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common Anglo-Saxon formula "the witnesses are written and their hands
'
touched. 216

FIGURE 8. Swearing an Oath. In this frame from the Bayeux Tapestry, Harold Godwinson
touches two reliquaries while promising to support William of Normandy's claim to the English
throne.

Alternatively, unilateral gentle touching can communicate the assertion
of legal authority over another person or thing. For instance, the early

Roman procedure for claiming property, the legis actio sacramentum, enBAVARIANS
21

118 (Theodore J. Rivers trans., 1977).

Danet & Bogoch, supra note 78, at 103. The original Anglo-Saxon is usually (but inaccu-

rately) translated as "the witnesses and their signatures are recorded."
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abled one person to claim another person as a slave by touching him with
a ceremonial rod. The legal importance of this touching was reflected in
the verbal declaration that accompanied it: "I affirm that this man is mine
by Quiritary right according to his proper title. As I have declared, so,
look you, I have laid my staff on him." 1 ' The traditional Roman
mancipatio ceremony also involved a claim-touch. Gaius tells us that "the
taker by the mancipation must grasp the thing which is being mancipated
to him, which is why the ceremony is called mancipatio, the thing being
taken with the hand." '18 In early medieval German law, the procedure for
reclaiming a serf who had renounced his lord in favor of another analogously required the first lord to touch and take hold of the serf's coattail
(see Figure 9).219

FIGURE 9. Reclaiming a Serf. In this illustration from the Heidelberg Manuscript of the
Sachenspiegel, a lord reclaims his serf by grasping his coat-tail while two other serfs swear in the
lord's support.

...

INSTITUTES,

218

Id. at 1.121.

supra note 176, at 4.16.

2'9 CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

supra note 168, at 77.
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Finally, unilateral gentle touching in certain performance-based societies may indicate a legal claim against a person or signal his legal culpability pursuant to a claim. In Mesopotamian law, grasping a person's
hem, under appropriate circumstances, constituted a formal complaint.2 2
Under the Roman Twelve Tables, a judgment creditor claimed against a
'
delinquent debtor by taking hold of "some part of the debtor's body." 221
In ancient Hebrew law, the individuals who testified against any man
who was later condemned to stoning were required to "lay their hands
upon his head" to indicate that he was guilty.222
The second broad type of tactile legal communication common in performance cultures involves forceful touching, a physically more powerful
and potentially more painful form of contact generally designed to emphasize the seriousness of a claim, relationship, or transaction. Thus, one
Mesopotamian could announce a legal accusation against another by hitting him on the forehead.22 3 A Mesopotamian surety could legally guarantee a debt by striking or slapping the forehead of a debtor.224 One interpretation of the earliest form of the Roman stipulatioprocedure maintains
that after going through the question-and-answer, the promisor bound the
promisee by striking him with a ceremonial staff.225 In eleventh and
twelfth century Europe, a knight could legally confer knighthood on a
squire by hitting him on the face or neck with the flat of his hand; this
blow (the "colie") was later commuted to a gentler dubbing by the
sword.226 Perhaps it was familiarity with the use and mnemonic efficacy
of this somewhat painful procedure that once prompted William of Normandy to joke that he should drive a symbolic knife through an abbot's
hand instead of simply giving the knife to him as a token of conveyance:
"That's the way to give land. 12 27 According to French feudal law, a purchaser of goods could analogously conclude a legal agreement with a vendor by striking the palm of the vendor's hand with his own.22 The same
220 Malul, supra note 155,
221 INSTITUTES, supra note
222 Leviticus 24:14 (Revised
222 Malul, supra note 155,
224 Id. at 307.

at 560.
176, at 4.21.
Standard Version).
at 581.

225

MacCormack, supra note 186, at 453-54.

220

MARJORIE ROWLING, LIFE IN MEDIEVAL TIMES 39 (1979).

227

POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 168, at 87 (quoting in translation the Cartulaire de

I'abbaye de la Sainte Triniti du Mont de Rouen).
228 BRISSAUD, supra note 115, at 491.
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practice was known in early medieval Germany, where it was termed
2 " To this day, African Shona women may legally allege
Handschlag.'
adultery or seduction by striking an offending man with an underapron.23 o
In a related vein, members of performance cultures may use forceful
touching to communicate legal meaning and significance to witnesses of
transactions or claims. Children attending important legal ceremonies in
performance cultures may be struck to focus their attention on a certain
time and place of legal consequence. In early medieval France, child witnesses had their ears boxed or tweaked.2"" Violence of this kind was occasionally recorded in contemporary writings. One eleventh century Norman charter notes the presence at a transaction of "William, infant, son of
Fulk Moirus, who on account of the memory of this thing received a blow
at the altar in the sight of many. ' 23 2 As the last phrase of this record
suggests, such a striking would not only have had a tactile effect on the
child, but also a profound visual impact on other witnesses.
The third basic method by which legal meanings may be tactilely conveyed in performance cultures is by kissing, a specific form of touching
that appears to mark the creation or recognition of a particularly close
and iritimate bond. In the early Middle Ages, a kiss (osculum) signaled
the establishment of a feudal relationship between lord and vassal. The
kiss was so central a part of the process of paying homage that the procedure became known in some quarters as "a kissing. '2 33 The lord generally kissed the vassal full on the mouth, literally making him (in incidental reference to the hand gestures of fealty described earlier) a "man of
229 George Sellett et al,, Archaic Methods of Validating a Contract-The "Blow" and the "Libation," 21 MICH. L. REV. 79, 83-84 (1922-23).
230 Robert Seidman, Rules of Recognition in the Primary Courts of Zimbabwe: On Lawyers'

Reasonings and Customary Law, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 871, 891 (1983).
13'
BRISSAUD, supra note 115, at 368-69 & n.5; see also MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 114
(L.A. Manyon trans., 1961). On a similar custom in early Germanic law, see HUEBNER, supra note
152, at 242. On the medieval English practice of "beating the bounds" of a village, during which
"small boys ... had their buttocks bumped up against the trees and rocks which marked the bounds,
so that they could remember them better," see GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, ENGLISH VILLAGERS OF
THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 368 (1941).
22 TABUTEAU, supra note 181, at 149 (quoting in translation a charter from Saint-Pierre de
Preaux, dated to between 1078 and 1096).
233 ERNEST CRAWLEY, STUDIES OF SAVAGES AND SEX 129 (Theodore Besterman ed., Books for
Libraries Press 1969) (1929).
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mouth and hands."2 4 In eleventh century Normandy-outside the context
of vassalage-an alienor might kiss a recipient of land to mark the transfer of property between them.2 35 Kisses were similarly bestowed on new
knights and people taking legal office.23 6 Kissing could also communicate
the resolution of a legal dispute.23 7 In this context it may be that the ritual
kiss of bride and groom at the end of the modern Western marriage ceremony originally had little or no romantic purpose, being but one application of a common technique of tactilely (and visually) communicating the
creation, existence, or reanimation of a legal relationship. In the words of
one scholar, "[It] recalls old laws and customs which considered it a formal promise of marriage, or even, in Roman law, a legal bond making the
future bride a quasi uxor."2 8 A somewhat more marginal use of kissing
in the law of our own writing culture is the requirement that individuals
swearing on the Bible "kiss the book."2 9
The fourth way in which members of performance cultures can express
legal meanings in tactile form is by transfer, that is, the practice of one
party handing something over to another as a token of conveyance, pledge,
or performance. Transfer obviously has a visual dimension (one sees an
object being passed), and in that sense it has already been considered, but
its tactile aspect is also significant. After all, holding and letting go of
objects are among the most fundamental of tactile experiences. The
performative grantor-say, the early medieval European-who during a
conveyance ceremony holds a clod of earth, tactilely communicates to himself his possession of land. Instead of merely declaring his possession in
words, he literally feels the damp or dry soil in his hand. It is an unmistakeable tactile reminder of his association with it. When the conveyance
is made and the clod is passed, the grantee of the land knows what he has
acquired by feeling the dirt that has been given to him. Even when mem23, LE GOFF, supra note 30, at 242-44, 252.

115 TABUTEAU, supra note 181, at 121. For an early twelfth century instance of a property
conveyance sealed with a kiss between the parties, see LE GOFF, supra note 30, at 238.
236 CRAWLEY, supra note 233, at 121.
21S7 Id. at 125; see also George von Rautenfeld, Nonverbal Communication in the "Nibelungenlied" Compared with that in the "Chanson de Roland" and the "Poema de Mio Cid" 104-05 (1980)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (suggesting that in early medieval Germany, it may have been the responsibility of the offender to initiate the kiss).
238 Willem Frijhoff, The Kiss Sacred and Profane:Reflections on a Cross-CulturalConfrontation, in A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GESTURE, supra note 5, 223-24.
"I BAUML & BAUML, supra note 150, at 215.
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bers of performance cultures use more indirectly symbolic objects to signify conveyance or pledge, they are still engaged in tactile communication.
The grantor or pledgor knows he is giving something up because he loses
a tactile stimulus. He no longer feels anything in his hand. At the same
time, the person receiving property or gaining the benefit of a pledge
knows he has acquired something because he can feel an object he could
not feel before.
In addition to these four forms of tactile legal expression used by or
between individuals in most performance cultures, members of a number
of performance-based societies believe that their guiding divinities or spirits can communicate the legal guilt or innocence of accused persons by
touching them, or causing them to be touched, in certain ways. This type
of tactile communication is facilitated and indeed called for in the ordeals
I briefly described in considering "The Sight of Law." In an ordeal, the
implicated divinity or spirit may not personally and directly touch the
proband, but the proband is frequently commanded to touch or to otherwise come in contact with a substance that somehow represents or has
been associated with the entity (through consecration, perhaps). If the
proband can sustain the touch without injury-if he can carry the hot
iron, or immerse his arms in the hot water-it signifies his innocence, and
he is freed. If he cannot sustain the touch-if it is too painful for him, or
too damaging to him-that signifies his guilt. The judgment is interpreted
visually by witnesses, but the ceremony of the ordeal is calculated so that
the accused man does not merely see, but also physically feels a divine
sign of his guilt or innocence. His reaction to this touch of the gods seals
his legal fate. [ndeed, that touch may be the ultimate form of tactile legal
communication.
D. Smell and Taste: Savory-Sense Communication and Legal Expression
1.

The Cultural Significance of Savor

The associated savory media of smell and taste play less obvious roles
than sound, sight, and touch in the communication of significant meaning
in performance cultures. Even so, their performative significance far exceeds the minimal relevance and role we commonly ascribe to them.24 In
240 On the minor impact of smell- and taste-based media in, for instance, modern art, see John

Harris, Oral and Olfactory Art, 13 J. AESTHETic EDUC. 5 (1979).
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the first place, performance-based societies tend to be highly olfactory.
The habit of reading and writing has not yet encouraged performative
individuals to ignore, and even suppress, information received through
their noses as opposed to their eyes. 24 1 Indeed, from the perspective of
modern America, with its personal deodorants, air fresheners, and complex public sanitation systems,2 42 it is almost impossible to appreciate how
simultaneously rich and oppressive performative olfactory experience is.
As pleasant and unpleasant odors envelop members of performance cultures at every turn-in the fields, in the home, and in the marketplace-it
is only natural that such individuals should use smells and scents both to
communicate and to understand.
In ancient Near Eastern culture, sweet smells of perfume, incense, and
sacrificial smoke indicated both divine presence and divine approval; they
were therefore common features in religious and political ritual.243 The
Hebrew prophet Isaiah foretold that God would communicate his displeasure with men by a changing odor: "instead of sweet smell, there shall be
stink. '2 44 Homer's Greeks similarly believed that their gods signified anger by leaving burnt offerings "charred in acrid smoke. ' 2 45 The early medieval Church not only employed incense to communicate with God, but
additionally regarded sweet smells as God's way of communicating the
holiness of his ministers. This was the famous "odor of sanctity," which
was invariably supposed to issue from the exhumed remains of any
saint.24 6
241 On the cultural and literary significance of smell and fragrance in European culture as late
as the seventeenth century, see FEBVRE, supra note 8, at 423-32; MANDROU, supra note 8, at 56-57.
242 On the anti-olifactory bias of the modem age, see Lance Strate, Media and the Sense of

Smell, in INTR/MEDIA: INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION IN A MEDIA WORLD 428 (Gary
Gumpert & Robert Cathcart eds., 3d ed. 1986) (1979). In light of this bias, it is significant that
contemporary English contains many expressions associating odor with wrong. A suspicious arrangement "smells." A bad idea "stinks." A person who says one thing and does another "reeks of
hypocrisy."
214 On the significance of smell in performative religious practice, see Roy BEDICHEK, THE
SENSE OF SMELL 227-33 (1960); ANNICK LE GUERER, SCENT: THE MYSTERIOUS AND ESSENTIAL
POWERS OF SMELL 109-20 (Richard Miller trans., 1992); D. MICHAEL STODDART, THE SCENTED
APE: THE BIOLOGY AND CULTURE OF HUMAN ODOUR (1990) (especially chapter 7). On the political uses of scent (especially in ancient Near Eastern palace architecture), see EDWIN T. MORRIS,
FRAGRANCE: THE STORY OF PERFUME FROM CLEOPATRA TO CHANEL 57, 71 (1984).
244 Isaiah 3:24 (King James Version).
215 BEDICHEK, supra note 243, at 225 (quoting Homer).
24 LE GUERER, supra note 243, at 120-27.
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The acknowledged value of communication and comprehension through
smell in performance cultures incidentally adds a further dimension to
what I have identified as a cultural tendency towards physical closeness
and proximity.2 4 Like touch, smell is in most cases only employable and
understandable at close physical range. Thus, members of traditional
Arab cultures prefer to stand close to one another so that they may literally be in the other's breathing space, the smell of breath supposedly being
very communicative of a person's character and disposition.2 48 The fact
that we are so literally and metaphorically protective of our "breathing
space" indicates how far our writing culture has backed away from olfactory communication.
The sense of smell is inherently linked with the sense of taste. Without
a sense of smell, taste is robbed of most of its meaning. Conversely, sensitivity to smell in most instances promises sensitivity to taste and, by implication, the habits of eating and drinking. In performance cultures, the
general sharing of taste through food and drink routinely communicates
friendship, approval, agreement, or transition. For instance, in the language of the Luba people of Zaire the verb "to eat" denotes new access to
power. One "eats the office of chief" (becomes chief). 24 9 Members of performance cultures may consciously manipulate individual tastes to emphasize, or even to alter, the basic meanings of ingestion. African Songhay
culture thus holds that respect can be communicated to visitors by the
preparation of savory sauces; contempt or disapproval may be signaled by
the preparation and serving of a "bad sauce. "250 In Hausa society, the
cultural and communicative significance of tasting and eating is emphasized by the prominence of these activities in folktales, a majority of which
"centre around food, tasting, eating or swallowing."25' 1 In one remarkable
Hausa tale, all the actors in the story are foods and tastes: Salt, Pepper,
Nari (a peanut-based sauce), Onion Leaves, and Daudawar Batso (a
24
248

tion, in

See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
HALL,

supra note 202, at 49; see also Michael Argyle, The Syntaxes of Bodily Communica145 (Jonathan Benthall & Ted Polhemus eds.,

THE BODY AS A MEDIUM OF EXPRESSION

1975). The Warao people of Venezuela analogously believe that a sorcerer's bad breath is a sign of
his recent return from the underworld. Constance Classen, The Odor of the Other; Olfactory Symbolism and Cultural Categories, 20 ETHOS 133, 153 (1992).

248 FABIAN, supra note 31, at 24.
25 STOLLER, supra note 17, at 18-19.
2"' Ritchie, supra note 122, at 114. This prominence recalls the fascination with feasting that is

evident in both the Homeric and early medieval epics.
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strong-smelling sauce).2 52

2. The Savor of Law
Just as the law of performance cultures has a sound, a look, and a feel,
it has a savor. Failure to recognize this fact can cause members of writing
cultures to overlook or misinterpret important forms of performative legal
expression. For instance, members of writing cultures may not immediately appreciate that in a performance culture, the release of scent can
communicate significant changes in an individual's legal condition, relationships, or obligations.2 53 In ancient Mesopotamia, many such changes
were marked by anointing individuals with the scented oil ubiquitous in
Near Eastern cultures. We know that anointing played a part in the conveyance of land, although we do not know whether this anointing was of
the parties by each other, of the parties by themselves, or of witnesses by
the parties.25 4 Anointing could also announce a Mesopotamian betrothal
or, according to some scholars, a marriage.2 55 It could similarly be used in
freeing a slave, provided it was done in the early morning, with the slave
facing the rising sun. 256 This orientation may itself have been aromatically
significant. In the first place, the heat of the sun can enhance the scent of
certain oils. In the second place, if the oil poured on the head were mixed
with fat (as was sometimes done in the Near East), the heat of the sun
would eventually cause the fat to melt, gradually releasing the scented
unguents over the body: 257 the higher the sun rose in the sky, the easier
perhaps it became for the former slave (and others) literally to sniff the
scent of freedom.
Evidence for the use of scent in .the legal transactions of performance
cultures outside the Near East is far less common, but occasionally one
finds a legal event that has either an overt or an incidental aromatic aspect. Here the point is not that olfactory communication of legal meanings
212

Id. at 115.

For a general discussion of the sociological link between change and the release of scent, see
David Howes, Olfaction and Transition:An Essay on the Ritual Uses of Smell, 24 CANADIAN REV.
Soc. & ANTHROPOLOGY 398 (1987).
2
Malul, supra note 155, at 440.
255 Id. at 204.
21 Id. at 58.
257 MORRIS, supra note 243, at 62.
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is commonplace, but that it occurs at all. In early medieval Europe, for
instance, the ultimate legal act of royal coronation reached its climax not
when the king took his verbal oath or assumed the visual symbols of his
office, but at the unction, when the officiating cleric poured aromatic oil
over the king's shoulders and head, formally and mystically communicating his ascension to both him and the assembled throng.2""
In performance cultures, tasting, eating, and drinking may similarly
communicate a legal transaction or event to immediate parties or to witnesses. The meaning of these acts nonetheless varies from culture to culture. In the ancient Near East, taking a meal together could communicate
the establishment of a binding agreement. A Hebrew tradition notably
regards the Old Covenant with Yahweh as a meal taken together in his
presence."' In Exodus, God moreover says to Moses that through the
eating of unleavened bread at Passover, "it shall be to you as a sign on
your hand and a memorial between your eyes, that the law of God may be
in your mouth."2 ' In the Middle Ages, a couple ate together to signal
their marriage (which may be the source of the modern practice of watching the bride and groom as they eat the first slice of wedding cake).2"'
Among the Anglo-Saxons, a ritual meal or feast could also communicate
the revival of a relationship after a dispute.262 A similar custom is still
common in parts of Africa. Among the Ibo people, the party judged to be
at fault is required to take food to the other party so that the two can eat
together, thereby communicating their new-found peace to themselves and
to observers.26 3 It has also been asserted that the early medieval quitclaim
originally involved a formal dinner representing the end of contention over
land.26 4
On occasion, meals marking a legal transaction may be shared with
witnesses. This practice serves both as an advance gesture of thanks to the
2" H.G. Richardson, The Coronation in Medieval England, 16
dus 24:11).
o Exodus 13:9 (Revised Standard Version).
261 PETER FARB & GEORGE AMELEGOS, CONSUMING
EATING

111, 116 (1960).
12 (1972) (citing Exo-

TRADITIO

... ZACHARIAS P. THUNDYIL, COVENANT IN ANGLO-SAXON THOUGHT

PASSIONS: THE ANTHROPOLOGY

OF

5 (1980).

262 Warren Lehman, The First English Law, 6 J. LEGAL HIsT. 1, 17 (1984).
262 HOLLEMAN,

supra note 165, at 11;

ELIAS,

supra note 105, at 269. On eating together as a

mode of reconciliation in various Pacific Island cultures, see CRAWLEY, supra note 233, at 255.
26 Fredric L. Cheyette, The Invention of the State, in ESSAYS ON MEDIEVAL CIVILIZATION 15
(Bede K. Lackner & Kenneth R. Philip eds., 1978).
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witnesses for supporting the transaction afterwards and as a means of
communicating the nature and'importance of the legal event. In Mesopotamian law, for instance, parties and witnesses to a land transaction were
required to "eat the ram and drink the cup" 26' 5 before their dealings were
legally complete and valid. In African Kamba society, food and drink are
still provided to witnesses to a property transaction. 266 Similar practices
are known to Ghanian Akan law and to the law of the Philippine Nabaloi
people.26
Although drinking often accompanies eating on legal occasions, drinking may mark a transaction on its own. In Homeric Greece, for instance,
contracting parties poured wine into a bowl and shared the contents to
communicate the mixing of their wills and fates.2 6 The mythic Argonauts
marked their mutual compact by drinking a mixture of "barley, bull's
blood, and seawater. '26 9 Herodotus reported that Greek mercenaries once
indicated their agreement to serve by drinking a mixture of wine, water,
and the blood of a human sacrifice.27 ° Continuing an ancient Teutonic
tradition, bargains in early medieval Germany and central Europe were
also sealed by drinking together.27 1 In traditional Zulu culture, drinking
beer from the same vessel formally communicated reconciliation. 2 In native Fijian society, drinking from the same dish communicates the completion of a legal marriage. 273 This practice survives as an archaism in many
writing cultures, with bride and groom drinking from the same weddingor loving-cup. The modern habit of toasting someone or something may
faintly echo these performative procedures.274
From time to time, drinking for legal purposes may be unilateral. In
this situation, taste communicates legal meaning or change to only one
211Malul,

supra note 155, at 440 (quoting a Mesopotamian formula).
H.E. Lambert, Land Tenure Among the Akamba, 6 AFR. STUD. 157, 171 (1947).
267 Allott, supra note 158, at 85.
28 GERNET,supra note 176, at 168.
268

269

Id.

270 Id.
271

BRISSAUD,

supra note 115, at 494; THUNDYIL, supra note 259, at 68; Ibbetson, supra note

151, at 483.

17' Edwin W. Smith, African Symbolism, 82 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL

INST. GREAT BRrr-

AIN & IR. 13, 29 (1952).
272

1885).

274

H. CLAY
Id. at 201.

TRUMBULL, THE

BLOOD COVENANT 193 (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons
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party, although the consumption of the drink may provide a convenient
visual sign for witnesses. The record of one Anglo-Saxon conveyance thus
reads:
[O]ne Ulphus, the son of Toraldus, turned aside into York, and filled the horn he was wont to drink out of with wine; and before the
altar, upon his bended knee, drinking it, gave away to God and to
St. Peter, the prince of the apostles, all his lands and revenues.2 78
It is reasonable to conclude that the cups and drinking horns that rested in
so many medieval muniment rooms as physical records of land transfers
either were used in a similar way or materially recalled an earlier
tradition. 6
In a performance culture, drinking to transfer property may also constitute an oath to make good the transfer. Both eating and drinking are directly associated with oath-taking in many' performance-based societies.
Frequently, the food and drink consumed are seen as divinely blessed or
of divine origin, and are thus regarded as vehicles through which the gods
or spirits can communicate legal meanings to the participants. This makes
them particularly attractive tools in oath-based ordeals. In the early Middle Ages, clerics were subjected to "the ordeal of the sacred morsel." If a
cleric were innocent and swore truly, God would enable him to swallow a
morsel of consecrated bread or cheese; if the cleric were guilty and swore
falsely, God would prevent him from swallowing. 277 Among the Mabulu
people of Nigeria, a person may analogously swear to his ownership of
land by swallowing a piece of earth and saying, "if this is not my earth,
may I never eat the fruits thereof and live," 2 78 under the belief that gods
or spirits acting through the eaten earth will kill the oath-swearer if the
claim is legally false.
If the gods can convey legal meaning to man through eating and drinking, it stands to reason that man can convey legally significant meanings
to the gods by offering them food and drink. This is attempted in many
"1 2

ARCHER POISON, LAW AND LAWYERS, OR SKETCHES AND ILLUSTRATIONS OF LEGAL

HISTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 223 (London, Longman 1840).
...See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
277 HENRY C. LiE,
SUPERSTITION AND FORCE 263-73 (Haskell House 1971) (1870); Roger D.
Groot, Lie Detectors: Of Sacred Morsels and Polygraphs, 10 LEGAL STUD. F. 203, 205 (1986).
278 DOOB, supra note 64, at 304-05 (quoting a Mabulu formula reported
in 1 C.K. MEEK, THE
NORTHERN TRIBES OF NIGERIA 264-65 (1925)).
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performance cultures by a variety of techniques. Libation, for instance,
involves offering a liquid (generally blood or water) to a deity by pouring
it over an object associated with the deity. Libations were legally significant in early Greek and Roman law where they generally denoted agreements or promises. In Rome, the act of libation was implicated in the
words of the ancient stipulatio contract, the contractee's answer of
"spondeo" coming from a Greek word meaning "drink-offering." This
suggests that it may once have been customary to make such an offering
27
before an agreement could be concluded.

III.

THE PHENOMENON OF PERFORMANCE

'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone,
All just supply and all relation.
John Donne

80

In our own culture, we are accustomed to communicating and assimilating most of our important intellectual information through individual
and isolated media. Our most powerful expressive form, the written word,
has effectively monopolized its contexts. It has generally excluded "lesser"
forms of aural, tactile, and savory communication from its sensory space.
Writers communicate by manipulating words and letters, not sounds,
touches, scents, or flavors. Under the impetus of print technology, writing
has even displaced other kinds of visual expression with which it is more
theoretically compatible. Thus, our serious treatises usually have either
very few pictures (frequently segregated from the text in a collection of
"plates") or no pictures at all.
Our culture's reliance on writing has also influenced the ways in which
we experience nonwritten media. When engaged in serious cultural communication, we are inclined to isolate specific nonwritten forms of expression from each other, just as we routinely isolate our writing from those
forms. We therefore separate music (aural) from painting (visual), and
dance (visual) from sculpture (tactile).2 8 ' We perceive each of these prod170 GE.RNE, supra note 176, at 169; JOLOwicz, supra note 91, at 294 n.3; Sellett et al., supra
note 229, at 83.
280

AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD (facsimile of first edition, Cambridge 1951) (1611).

281 On the separation of the arts in modem Western society, see Edmund R. Leach, Aesthetics,
in THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIMITIVE SocIETY 27 (Edward E. Evans-Pritchard ed., 1956). For a
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ucts as fundamentally different. Even on those rare occasions when we
unite two or more sensory elements, we still try to separate creative responsibility for each of them. We divide the labor of creating a ballet
between the composer (who deals in what is heard) and the choreographer
(who deals in what is seen).2 82 We may even take steps to ensure that
information that is capable of being transmitted and appreciated through
several senses simultaneously is only transmitted and appreciated through
one. For instance, the rules of most art galleries not only forbid visitors
from touching sculpture, but they also discourage talking, just as we discourage talking in a library. This coincidence underlifles the constraining
influence writing has had on our general behavior, even where writing
itself is not involved.
Our law has hardly been immune from these efforts at sensory dissociation. For example, the parol evidence rule dictates that if parties make an
agreement in writing, that writing, if unambiguous, becomes legally definitive. All prior or contemporaneous utterances of the parties become immaterial. Instead of being considered as parts of a single expressive event,
"relevant" writing is separated from "irrelevant" speech. Within the
ranks of the legal profession, we have similarly come to regard legal
speaking and legal writing as separate tasks. The former is the special
province of the litigator who spends his or her professional life going to
court and arguing cases. In England, the distinction between legal speaking and legal writing has actually been institutionalized, with barristers
doing oral advocacy while solicitors draft most of the legal documents.
Even within the realm of visual communication, the law is almost entirely
a matter of written words. When an American or English appellate court
reviews a trial court decision, it reviews the written record of what was
said without asking to see living witnesses or inquiring about their demeanor while testifying. By virtue of the same understanding, our law
reports, statute books, and texts rarely include illustrations.
brief discussion of the particular impact of print on the process of sensory separation, see McLUHAN,

supra note 17, at 159.
282 Having said this, it must be acknowledged that largely under the influence of modern audiovisual technology, avante-garde post-modernist artists are increasingly rejecting the standard separation of art forms in favor of a more integrated approach. In the context of this paper, it is significant
that one of these new integrated art forms has actually been termed "performance art." See JEssICA
PRINz, ART DiscotlsE/DIsCOURSE IN ART 1-42 (1992). My thanks to Marc Silverman for reminding me of this point.
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In performance cultures, the basic communicative idiom is very different. Instead of suppressing certain media or keeping them separate, members of preliterate or marginally literate societies continually combine media. In their highest forms of. cultural and intellectual expression, speech
routinely gives voice to gesture and gesture gives shape to speech; music
gives sound to sculpture, while sculpture gives substance to music. Law is
simultaneously heard, seen, and sometimes even felt and savored. Ultimately, the meaning of significant cultural and legal messages resides less
in the individual components of communication (although these must be
recognized) than in their synthesis, performance.
In the first part of this section, I will review how different media work
together in performance cultures to transmit lore and law. In the second
part of this section, I will consider the circumstances contributing to the
popularity of performance as a cultural and legal "meta-medium." In the
third and final part of this section, I will discuss the distribution of information among the various sensory components of performance and ponder
the pitfalls that distribution presents for our evaluation of cultural and
legal meaning in performance-based societies.

A. Performing Lore and Law
In performance cultures, performances characterize innumerable social
and intellectual events that members of our writing culture would regard
as implicating only a single medium, and frequently only a single aspect
of that medium. For instance, we commonly characterize the recitation of
poetry as a form of aural communication, relying on the speaking and
hearing of words. In a performance culture, the recitation of poetry involves much more. In ancient Greece, for example, the poet's words were
delivered as part of a larger aural-visual-tactile complex of music and
dance.2 83 In this context, it is no accident that the single word mousike,
which denoted "the art of the Muses," referred to words, music, and
283 BRUNO GENTILI, POETRY AND ITS PUBLIC IN ANCIENT GREECE 24 (1988). Early in the
fifth century B.C., the lyric poet Pindar acknowledged the sensory complexity of Greek poetic performance in these terms: "The garlands placed like a yoke upon the hair exact from me payment of
this sacred debt: to blend together properly the lyre with her intricate voice, and the shout of oboes,
and the placing of words." THOMAS, supra note 100, at 118 (quoting PINDAR, OLYMPIAN ODES

3.6-.9).
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dance equally. 2 4 Anthropologists have noted similar sensory associations
in traditional African societies. Here, the roles of words, music, gesture,
and dance are so inextricably mixed that one anthropologist has suggested
that "not just the tape recorder or bound volume which records the sound
alone, but perhaps a full-length color film appears to be the one medium
that can catch and convey something of the complete, complex and magnificent texture that is the [Ozidi] epic." 2 5 Words and music in particular
are so interdependent that African performers have difficulty dictating the
text of a poem without musical accompaniment. 8 8
The same general points might be -made about the exhibition of sculpture and carving. Largely because of the constraints we have imposed on
aural and tactile expression, we tend to conceive of such exhibition as a
visual event. Members of performance cultures, however, rarely separate
the experience of seeing sculptures and carvings from touching them and/
or singing about them. When the medieval supplicant saw the religious
image and felt it, it became a visual-tactile presence. When the Australian
aborigine sees the churinga and sings, it is a visual-aural presence.2" 7
Even the narrowly visual experience of sculpture in performance cultures
tends to be much more complex than it is in our own. Frequently,
performative sculptures are exhibited in the midst of dances or processions, making them part of a broader kinetic display. The image is carried; the carving is worn. Analogously, members of performance cultures
treat sculptures as creatures of color as well as form. In our sensorially
subdivided universe, statues generally have no color except that given
them by their material, such as marble white and metal gray. In many
performance cultures, sculpture and painting merge with striking results.
Even the Hellenic Greeks, whose sculptures we experience today as pris"" Id.; see also GIOVANNI COMOTTI, MUSIC IN GREEK AND ROMAN CULTURE 3 (Rosaria V.
Munson trans., 1989); HAVELOCK, supra note 20, at 150-51.
282 OKPEWHO, supra note 61, at 52 (quoting J.P. Clark, The Azudu Saga, I AFR. NOTES 9
(1963)); see also VANSINA, supra note 135, at 34; Daniel P. Biebuyck, The African Heroic Epic, in
HEROIC EPIC AND SAGA 336 (Felix J. Oinas ed., 1978).
286 OKPEWHO, supra note 61, at 59.
287 Howes, supra note 44, at 63. Likewise, in Africa, "music is usually performed whenever
masks are displayed." Akin Euba, Introduction to Music in Africa, in AFRICAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 225 (Richard Olaniyan ed., 1982); see also PAUL S. WINGERT, PRIMITIVE ART: ITS TRADITIONS AND STYLES 160 (1965) ("Not only the masks but many of the figures were intended to be
used and/or viewed with the accompaniment of drum rhythms, vocal chants, or songs.").
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tinely white, enthusiastically painted their works.2 88
The sensory interdependence of performance cultures, as evidenced by
these and other communicative practices, is matched by the sensory interdependence of performative law. Just as members of performance cultures
simultaneously use different media to recite poetry and exhibit sculpture,
they frequently combine different channels of communication in legal expression. Law is not so much said, sung, gestured, or felt as it is holistically performed. This performance involves far more than surrounding a
single legally efficacious medium (such as speech) with spectacular sensory supports., On the contrary, performative legality tends to reside in the
unity of sensory expression to the point where a fault of words or acts
may be equally fatal to the legality of a transaction. 8 '
Of course, just as contemporary Anglo-American law retains certain
aural, gestural, and tactile features, it is not altogether unfamiliar with
the orchestration of several sensory elements in performance. For instance,
it has been suggested that "performance" properly describes a modern
trial, considered as a work of legal theater simultaneously implicating and
relying on both verbal and nonverbal forms of expression.2 9 Such legal
ceremonies as the signing and witnessing of wills are perhaps performances of a less ambitious sort. In our own writing culture, these multisensory legal routines are nonetheless the exception rather than the rule.
Moreover, they either depend for their validity on strict adherence to written directions (will execution), or they are subject to written control and
correction on the basis of their written records (trials). Performance may
therefore not have disappeared from our legal universe, but it has certainly been marginalized. Our law is considered to reside primarily in
documents, not doings.
The same cannot be said of law in performance cultures. In societies
with little or no access to writing, law that cannot be inscribed is con2" GISELA M. RICHTER, A HANDBOOK OF GREEK ART 46 (1959). The paint has worn off over
the years.
289 The formalism of performative law has been exaggerated in most of the literature, but the

point that significant errors of either saying or doing can vitiate a proceeding is probably correct. See,
e.g., ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
14 (1952) (speaking of Anglo-Saxon law: "Any stumbling or stammering, any variation from what
has been ordained as to gesture or bodily position, is fatal.").
2o Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81 (1975).
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stantly being performed. Many of the specific aural, visual, tactile, and
savory legal acts highlighted so far are ultimately parts of larger
performative wholes. However useful and even analytically necessary it
has been to isolate them according to sensory category (in order to demonstrate the range of media put to legal purposes in performance cultures),
at least some must be put back in context if the reader is to understand
how most performative legal transactions are actually executed and
experienced.
Consider, for instance, the biblical transfer of a sandal (denoting the
transfer of land) that we incidentally encountered in "The Sight of
Law."2 9 In practice, this was only one component of a conveyancing procedure that depended on a subtle interweaving of aural, visual and tactile
elements. The Book of Ruth gives us a good sense of what usually occurred. According to Scripture, Naomi wished to sell land acquired from
her deceased husband Elimelech. The sale took place at the town gate,
with Naomi's relative Boaz acting as her agent. Boaz explained before
"ten men of the elders of the city" 29 2 that if an unnamed man who was
the closest blood relative of Naomi's husband wished to buy the land, he
had to do so then, or otherwise the right of purchase would fall to Boaz
himself in his own capacity as a relative. The man initially agreed to buy
the land, but then he reconsidered, saying to Boaz, "Buy it for yourself."12 93 At the same time, the man took off his sandal and gave it to Boaz,
for "it used to be the custom in Israel that, to make binding a contract of
redemption or exchange, one party would take off his sandal and give it to
the other."2'94 After receiving the sandal, Boaz turned to the witnesses and
declared,
You are witnesses this day that I have bought from the hand of
Naomi [albeit through the unnamed man] all that belonged to
Elimelech .... Also Ruth the Moabitess, the widow of Mahlon, I
have bought to be my wife, to perpetuate the name of the dead in
his inheritance .... [Ylou are witnesses this day.295
291

See supra note 175 and accompanying text.

292 Ruth 4:2. (Revised Standard Version).

s Ruth 4:6.
29 Ruth 4:7 (New American Bible). The Revised Standard translation of this verse inaccurately

refers to the transfer as merely "confirming" a transaction.
...Ruth 4:9-10 (Revised Standard Version).
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The witnesses then acknowledged their role by replying, "We are witnesses." 29 6 The formal conveyance had been aurally explained and acknowledged. It had been visually manifested in the passing of the sandal.
It had even been felt by the parties who gave away the sandal and acquired it. This was more than merely law for the ears, the eyes, or even
the hands. This was law for the whole body.
The ancient Roman transaction of transfer called mancipatio (parts of
which we have already encountered piecemeal) was also a performance.
The transaction required the presence of the immediate parties, at least
five Roman citizens of legal age, a bronze ingot, a set of scales, and a
person (librapens) to carry the objects. Mancipatio officially began when
the transferee grasped the object of transfer and said (in the case of a
slave), "I declare that this slave is mine according to Quiritary right, and
be he purchased to me with this bronze ingot and bronze scale."' 297 At this
point, the transferee struck the scales with the bronze, and then passed the
bronze to the transferor."' Again, the event was multisensory: a synthesis
of aural communication (the words and the sound of the bronze striking
the scale), visual communication (the grasping of the claimed object in the
view of the parties and of witnesses), and tactile communication (the
grasping of the claimed object by the transferee). A person who either
could not hear, see, or feel did not get the full sensory benefit of the
transaction.
Finally for present purposes, consider the performative dimensions of
the homage and investiture ceremony of the early Middle Ages. The procedure's gestural and tactile aspects appear nicely integrated with aural
elements in this unusually-complete description from 1127:
[The vassal] did homage in this way. The count asked [the vassal] if
he wished to become his man without reserve, and the latter answered: "I do." Then joining his hands together, he placed them in
the hands of the count, and they bound themselves together by a
kiss. In the second place, the man who had just done homage
pledged fidelity ... to the count in these words: "I promise on my
faith to be faithful from now on to count William and to observe
[the obligations of] my homage completely, in good faith, and with298

Ruth 4:11.

297 INsTITUTES,
298 Id.

supra note

176, at 1.119.
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out deceit, against all men," and this he swore on the relics of the

saints.... Finally, with a little stick which he held in his hand, the
count gave investiture [of fiefs] to all who had ... promised security,
299

done homage, and taken the oath.

A busier scene would be hard to imagine. The vassal spoke and heard the
words of his lord. He performed and saw various gestures. He was directly touched by his lord in the handclasp and in the kiss of homage, and
he felt the stick transferred to him upon investiture. A variety of senses
simultaneously informed him that he had acquired rights and obligations.
Neither he nor his witnesses could deny thefr combined evidence.
B.

Foundations of Performance

Why do members of performance cultures perform? Why do they insist
on communicating significant cultural and legal meanings through several
media to several senses simultaneously? Prosaic as it sounds, one reason is
surely sheer convenience. Most of the media used in performance cultures
rely on immediate, face-to-face contact between individuals. Effective
speech requires a speaker and a present listener; meaningful gesture needs
a gesturer and a present observer; touch needs a toucher and a person
present to be touched. Once any one medium forces a communicator into
face-to-face contact, other media immediately become accessible and useable to supplement or reinforce the communicator's message. It is therefore
convenient for a speaker to make a gesture or to extend a touch. The
performative individual who announces a legal accusation or makes a legal contract may additionally strike the defendant or shake the other
party's hand, if for no other reason than because they are there.
Contrast this with the situation of a writer in a writing culture. One of
the greatest strengths of writing as a medium is its technological capacity
physically to separate the sender of a message from its recipient. Unlike
speech, gesture, and so forth, writing can function totally apart from the
immediate presence of another person; the writer and the reader need
never meet. In order to take advantage of this feature, however, a writer
must put everything down on paper. What is not actually written (or,
'"
JOSEPH R. STRAYER, FEUDALISM 122 (Louis L. Snyder ed., 1965) (alteration in original)
(quoting GALBERT OF BRUGES, DE MULTRO ... KAROLI COMITIS FLANDIARUM 89 (Henri Pirenne
ed., 1891)).
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sometimes, what is expressed by other means) will not be communicated.
Writing thus discourages simultaneous reliance on speech, gesture, touch,
and savor. Even when members of writing cultures engage in other forms
of communication (aural, visual, or face-to-face), many frequently act as
writing has socialized them to act, that is to say, they draw minimal support from other media, no matter how physically convenient those media
may be.3 00 In the legal communities of some writing cultures, this behavior is a point of professional pride. The quintessential English barrister
never moves and rarely gestures in oral argument.
The convenience and popularity of performance in performance cultures is both reflected and reinforced by a belief that all forms of expression and sensory experience are somehow united. This belief is frequently
manifested in a tendency to describe-and even to react to-one medium
in terms of another, a phenomenon known as synesthesia.3" I In the midst
of a writing culture that insists on separating and classifying media and
sensory experience, modern American English preserves a limited number
of synesthetic expressions. Some colors are "loud" (sight described in
terms of sound); some smells are "sweet" (smell described in terms of
taste); some notes are "sour" (sound described in terms of taste).3 02 In
early Greek culture, these constructions occured so often that they exceeded "the boundaries of simple poetic license or artistic metaphor.
Rather, they reflected a fundamental habit of thought. Homer frequently
used visual imagery to describe aural communication. In the great Greek
epics, the voice of goddesses is "lily-like" and hymns "blaze-up" to
heaven. The Greek tragedian Aeschylus likewise reported that "the trumpet set the shores ablaze." Other Greek writers assimilated touch and
sight, describing "smoothness" and "whiteness" interchangeably. 303 The
lyric poet Simonides is said to have declared, in a famous synesthetic turn
of phrase, that "[p]ainting is silent poetry, poetry is painting that
speaks." 30 4 The language of the Old Testament reflects the power of syn"00 See TYLOR, supra note 132.
.01On synesthesia generally, see LAWRENCE E.

MARKS, THE UNITY OF THE SENSES: INTERRE-

LATIONS AMONG THE MODALITIES (1978). On the comparative prominence of synesthesia among
"primitive and archaic" peoples, see HEINZ WERNER, COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL
DEVELOPMENT 86-88 (1948).
.0. CHIDESTER, supra note 198, at 15-16.
.03 IRWIN, supra note 129, at 19-21, 209-13 passim.
'" CECIL M. BOWRA, THE GREEK EXPERIENCE 155
ATHENIENSIUM).

(1985) (citing

PLUTARCH, DE GLORIA
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esthesia in Hebrew tradition. One striking passage from the Book of Exodus, correctly translated, reads: "And all the people saw the thunderings,
and the lightning, and the voice of the shofar, and the mountain smoking." ' "Seeing" here has a distinctly aural as well as visual dimension.
Today, members of South American Andean cultures share a similar perspective on sense-expression and experience. One language group uses a
single word to describe pleasant speech (sound), the sweetness of dried
fruit (taste), and a soft tactile sensation (touch).3 06 From such easy associations it is but a very short step to the conclusion that all media are
naturally associated. There is, in other words, no bright-line distinction
between the so-called "different" media or senses, and any conscious preference for communicating through a single sense, as opposed to a combination of senses simultaneously, has no basis.
If we adopt this perspective on performance, we need to reinterpret
some of the legal transactions we have encountered. In synesthetic performance cultures, .a legal act we would associate with one sense may be
understood to also exist in another sensory dimension. For instance, a tactile transfer within a performance may be understood as having an aural
aspect. Passing an object to another person may be literally understood as
giving that person not just the property or a symbol of it, but one's word
(in practice, the words of conveyance or pledge spoken on transfer of the
object; the modern expression "to give one's word" may preserve this synesthetic conception). Some scholars have suggested that the Mesopotamian
practice of striking someone on the forehead to make an accusation against
him was considered not just a forceful way of making a legal claim, but a
literal placing of the spoken charges upon the accused's head.307 Here the
spoken word was presumed to have a tactile side. Taking an oath by taking a drink (or eating food) might similarly be seen as "swallowing" the
vow, causing it to become literally a part of the oath-taker and thus a
physical danger to him should it ever be dishonored.3 0 8 This synesthetic
0I Lawrence E. Marks et al., Perceiving Similarity and Comprehending Metaphor, 52

2 (1987) (quoting Exodus
20:18).
30' Constance Classen, Sweet Color, FragrantSongs: Sensory Models of the Andes and the
Amazon, 17 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 722, 727 (1990).
107 Malul, supra note 155, at 581-82.
108ROBERT R. MARETT, SACRAMENTS OF SIMPLE FOLK 172 (1933); see also THUNDYIL,
MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT

supra note 259, at 12 & nn.45, 48.
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belief was made explicit in early Hebrew culture, which had to accommodate it to the circumstances of a marginally literate society. The Book of
Numbers declared that if a woman were accused of adultery, she would
have to swear an oath that was structured to bring curses down on her if
she falsely claimed she was innocent. The officiating priest was required
to "write these curses in a book, and wash them off in to the water of
bitterness; and he shall make the woman drink the water of bitterness."3 0 9
It has recently been suggested that the South American Incas understood
their oath-taking ceremonies in very much the same way.31 0
A third reason for the popularity of performance in cultures with little
or no experience with writing has to do with the ephemerality of most
nonwritten media. The spoken word is fleeting, as is the gesture, the
touch, the smell, and the taste. In one instant, they can be heard, seen,
felt, and so on, and in the next instant they vanish. Even the material
props of performance-objects such as sculptures, carvings, or paintings-may be relatively rare and are frequently perishable. 31 1 This creates a fundamental problem for a preliterate or marginally literate society.
How can it preserve its core cultural and legal information over time? It
must preserve this information in order to survive and grow; if it fails it
will forever be reinventing its own traditions, potentially at great social
cost.
In this context, the secret of social survival is memory. Information
must be remembered by the individuals who hear, see, feel, or savor it, so
that they can retell it or recreate it later, and thereby pass it on to others
and to the next generation. This overwhelming need to remember makes
performance highly attractive as a strategy of communication. When information is performed, it is spread across the sensory spectrum. In part it
may be heard, in another part seen, in yet another part felt, and so on.
This has two consequences. First, every medium implicated becomes a
hook from which the thread of memory can hang. Someone might not
immediately remember hearing something, but they might remember seeing it or feeling it. Second, if several different media are used to transmit
exactly the same message, the power of that message as a whole is rein"' Numbers 5:23-24 (Revised Standard Version).
320 Classen, supra note 306, at 727.
...In some performance cultures, these objects may even be intentionally discarded after use. See
Suzanne Kiichler, Malangan: Art and Memory in a Melanesian Society, 22 MAN 238 (1987).
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forced to the point where the audience may be overwhelmed with sensory
input (making distraction or passivity, and hence forgetting, impossible). 12 In both cases, each additional medium employed in the transmission of important cultural or legal information serves -as additional insurance that the information will survive. 123
This observation may go far to explain why primary cultural and legal
transactions in performance cultures involve so many senses. It may explain, for instance, why the medieval Mass (much of which endures in
modern Catholic practice) summoned every sense to the knowledge and
love of God, 14 and why the homage ceremony that established the central
legal relationships of feudalism transcended simple speech to embrace visual and tactile communication. 5 The inherent memorability of performance also helps to explain why performance becomes less popular in writing cultures. Given the possibility of recording information physically in
such societies, remembering is less important, and performance is less necessary. 8 ' Indeed, because of the time and energy performance requires
and the opportunity cost it represents in information not inscribed, it may
become culturally and legally inefficient.
312 See for instance the discussion of "flow" elaborated in VICTOR TURNER, FROM RITUAL TO
THEATRE: THE HUMAN SERIOUSNESS OF PLAY 55-59 (1982).

"1' On the mnemonic superiority of multi-sensory over single-sense communication, see the numerous scientific studies cited and discussed in Khosrow Jahandarie, The Modality Effect 323, 380
(1987) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University). The greater mnemonic value of multisensory communication may indirectly help to explain the popularity of synesthesia in performance
cultures. See supra notes 301-10 and accompanying text. Meaning that is mentally understood and
experienced (if not always physically deployed) in what we would regard as several sensory channels
may be more accessible to the memory than meaning experienced as "just sound" or "just touch," etc.
On the general association between synesthesia and memory, see A.R. LURIA, THE MIND OF A
MNEMONIST 21-29 (Lynn Solotaroff trans., 1968).
:14 CHIDESTER, supra note 198, at 92.
315 In the words of one medieval scholar, "Word and gesture complemented each other; and,
when combined, they impressed themselves even more forcefully on the participants than either would
have done alone." von Rautenfeld, supra note 237, at 86.
It is particularly interesting that in the transition from performance to writing culture, the
more mnemonically effective media are the first to fall from social favor. For instance, active gesture is
eclipsed in culture and law before static pictures. Pictures, in turn, are culturally eclipsed before texts.
It is as if these various media go into decline as soon as the availability, popularity, and permanence
of written forms (script, and later print) makes them mnemonically redundant. On the mnemonic
superiority of action over stasis and pictures over text, see the numerous studies cited in Jahandarie,
supra note 313, at 362-64, 379.
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Performance and the Sensory Distribution of Meaning

The phenomenon of performance, whether explained on grounds of
convenience, psychology, or mnemonics, has important implications for
our understanding of performative cultural and legal meanings. In our
own writing culture, we expect each individual medium to be definitive. A
writing, painting, or sculpture should be self-contained and self-explanatory. If a work is not self-contained and self-explanatory, its meaning is
jeopardized as soon as it stands alone. In a performance culture, however,
a single medium never has to bear the entire communicative burden of a
message. Speech, for instance, need not be definitive where performers can
gesture. Showing can supplement telling. The sociologist Basil Bernstein
has in fact argued that, because of this constant interaction between media, societies or subcultures with less experience in writing need only employ a "restricted," as opposed to an "elaborated," code of verbal
communication.31 7
Failing to recognize that particular performative media appear in the
context of other media may be both unfortunate and misleading. Anthropologist Sam Gill has suggested that trying to understand a performance
by means of, say, spoken language alone
is something akin to trying to appreciate a ballet by reading the
musical score of the violin in the orchestra. If we know the ballet,
we might well see that the violin carries one of the major themes,
but what an enormous loss to our eyes, ears and hearts if this is all
318
we are ever permitted to see.
Another anthropologist, Ruth Finnegan, has taken "oralists" such as
Walter Ong to task for concluding from the written record of performative
speech that the heroes of most performative epics are type-characters with
little individual personality:3" 9 "Characterization . . . need not be expressed directly in words when it can be as clearly and as subtlely portrayed through the performer's face and gestures . . . .,320
M

Basil Bernstein, Elaborated and Restricted Codes: Their Social Origins and Some Conse-

quences, in THE ETHNOGRAPHY

OF COMMUNICATION (John J. Gumperz & Dell Hymes eds., 1964).

38a SAM GILL, BEYOND "THE PRIMrrIvE": THE RELIGIONS OF NONLITERATE PEOPLES 57

(1982); see also FINE, supra note 31, at 133.
39 ONG, supra note 12, at 70.
320 Ruth Finnegan, Literacy Versus Non-Literacy: The Great Divide, in MODES OF THOUGHT:
ESSAYS ON THINKING IN WESTERN AND NoN-WESTERN SOCIETIES 112, 137-38 (Robin Horton &
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Studying any medium of performative law (especially language, as actually spoken or as occasionally recorded in writing) only in isolation is
clearly unwise. Doing so may encourage the incorrect belief that
performative law is either limited or operates haphazardly. To take a simple example, a performative contract may not verbally identify its object.
In the Roman mancipatio, the parties referred to the slave in question
only as "this man," a generality that would be anathema in any modern
contract. The visual and tactile acts of touching or grasping settled the
slave's identity. Someone who merely heard the words of conveyance
would be ignorant of its substance, but someone who heard and saw
would understand. Likewise, a valid performative conveyance may not define the bounds of a conveyed property, or it may define them in the loosest of terms. An English charter from around 1209 thus recorded the
grant of half an acre in Dunfurlong without recording anything more. 21
Another English charter from about the same period described a grant of
land as extending "in length from a certain oak towards Hedislethe,
which has been uprooted there." '22 Here the writing may not have fully
captured what was said, but even the absence of further speech would not
necessarily have meant that bounds were left uncommunicated and unknown. Verbal vagueness may have been mitigated by a conveyancing
procedure that gave witnesses the opportunity of perambulating or viewing the boundaries or which presumed a preexisting visual familiarity
with territory. There was, therefore, little need to include lengthy and
difficult boundary descriptions, either in an oral conveyancing formula or
in any document recording the conveyance. Transactions such as these remind us that because members of performance cultures perform their legal
meanings, they deploy legal information in different patterns and sensory
ratios than we do. Failing to recognize this would reveal an intellectual
weakness that is less theirs than ours.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In the body of this Article I have made two fundamental points. First, I
have argued that just as members of societies having little or no experience with writing ("performance cultures") communicate significant inforRuth Finnegan eds., 1973).
"' MEMORY, supra note 2, at 64-65.
322 Id. at 64.
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mation through media embracing the entire sensory spectrum, they express their legal meanings in myriad permutations of sound, gesture,
touch, and savor. Resisting the temptations of "graphocentrism" on the
one hand and the siren song of orality on the other, we need to reorient
our study of preliterate and marginally literate legal expression to take all
these forms of communication into account. Second, I have suggested that
just as considerations of convenience, psychology, and memory encourage
members of these cultures to transmit significant information by several
media simultaneously, the law of such societies is not so much proclaimed,
gestured, or otherwise manifested in a single medium as it is holistically
performed. Because this practice enables legal meaning to be distributed
among different media instead of being concentrated in a single channel,
we must take care to consider the totality of verbal and nonverbal information in any given performative legal transaction.
To have considered the media and modes of communication and legal
expression favored in performance cultures is to have confronted a world
that is both strange and vaguely familiar. That world is strange because
members of performance cultures routinely employ and indeed prefer media and combinations of media that we have largely rejected-in some
instances, even ridiculed or forgotten-as carriers of important cultural
and legal information. It is nonetheless vaguely familiar because, even in
the face of our own rejection of nonwritten (and largely nonverbal) channels for formal intellectual communication, we still use them and indeed
depend on them in our daily, ordinary intercourse with one another. At
least to this extent, we are all performers of a sort.
Our limited familiarity with performative media and even performance
itself indicates that we can be open to performative meanings if we choose.
Although our own culture has trained us not to expect important
messages-in particular, legal messages-to be transmitted in certain
ways, we can still receive them by making a special effort to actually or
figuratively listen, look, feel, and so on. In a manner of speaking, this
Article has been an appeal for us to do just that-to "come to our senses"
long enough to transcend our writing-induced prejudices and experience
general and legal meaning on another culture's terms. Achieving these
goals may become easier as our own culture begins to change and new
audio and video technologies reacclimate us to nonwritten ways of knowing and telling.
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Adjusting our agenda of communicative relevance is nonetheless only a
first-albeit necessary-step towards understanding life and law in performance-based societies. As the reader may recall from the introduction,
a variety of media theorists have argued that because communication is
essential to the survival of any community, societies tend to favor behavior
and beliefs compatible with the characteristics of the media they depend
upon. If these theorists are right, then the societies and, by implication,
the legal systems I have described as relying on performance should reflect
the substantive characteristics of performance.
Identifying the characteristics of performance and exploring their possible manifestations in culture and law are obviously major undertakings
that require consideration in a separate paper. In order to whet the
reader's appetite, however, and in order to show just where the present
work has led us, let me briefly outline what I believe some of these characteristics and their manifestations to be.
First of all, performance is personal. Unlike writing, which can exist
apart from the writer, performance that depends on the use and synthesis
of such media as speech, gesture, and 'touch requires the ongoing, live
participation of a human actor. In a culture where little if anything can
be looked up in written words, no significant knowledge passes without
personal action. Without the performer, there is no performance. In this
environment, individuals quickly come to associate what is performed with
who is performing. Information cannot exist independent of the status or
reputation of the human individual presenting it. The objective appreciation of a message is inevitably entangled with a subjective appreciation of
its messenger.
As a result, the performative understanding of law differs profoundly
from our own. In a writing culture that can physically separate contracts,
judgments, and statutes from their proponents, we consider law to exist
apart from, and indeed above, human individuals. This attitude is perhaps
best captured, in the aspirational phrase "a government of laws and not of
men." 23 In performance cultures, however, laws and men are virtually
323

This quote is commonly attributed to John Adams, first from his Novanglus Letters of 1775,

JOHN ADAMS, 2 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 314 (Robert J. Taylor ed., 1977) (Novanglus Letter No.
VII), and repeated in the Massachusetts Constitution, MASS. CONST. of 1780, Declaration of Rights,
art. XXX. It is probably no coincidence that this concept was articulated at the same time that increased use and acceptance of print technology secured the written word's cultural ascendancy in
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coincident. 2 4 Finding the law generally means finding someone who can
perform or remember it. Disputes are resolved not by appealing to texts,
but rather by questioning live witnesses and invoking personal authorities.
In the absence of dispositive evidence, legal rights may depend not on
argument, but on comparative calculations of personal honor and status.
The oath of a nobleman may trump the oath of a slave.
Besides being personal, performance is also social. Communicative success depends on the live performer actually appearing before a live audience. This continually forces would-be tellers and knowers into social situations. What a contrast with the proverbial image of a writer scribbling
alone in a garret, or a reader poring over a book in the solitude of a
carrel! In the short term, the social aspect of performance encourages
members of performance cultures to be responsive to the needs and desires
of their present interlocutors, and equally encourages those interlocutors
to make their preferences known to physically accesible performers. Performances, unlike writings, are thus products of spontaneous action and
reaction. Ultimately, performances unburdened by permanent physical
form may be modified to suit different audiences on different occasions. In
performance cultures, there is therefore no standard performance-no
perfect, original epic poem for example-only variations on a theme.
In the long term, the social aspect of performance creates a cultural
atmosphere in which sociable behavior is greatly prized. The more sociable people are, the more likely they are to communicate, and the more
likely it is their cultural corpus will be preserved. Individuals in performance-based societies become so accustomed to and dependent upon contact
with one another that they tend to conceive of the very idea of "self" in
social terms, identifying themselves primarily by their social relationships
and the opinion that others have of them. This encourages the development of outwardly oriented "shame cultures" as opposed to inwardly ori5
ented "guilt cultures.

3'

2

The social nature of performance means that performative law must be
America.
..
' As one scholar has written of the ancient Greeks, "the laws for them are not cold principles
once [and] for all embodied in the statute-book. They come forward as living and speaking personalities-questioning, reasoning, appealing, exhorting." BUTCHER, supra note 108, at 173.
'25 On the provenance and history of these anthropological concepts, see Millie R. Creighton,
Revisiting Shame and Guilt Cultures: A Forty-Year Pilgrimage,18 ETHOS 279 (1990).
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presented in front of others. The identities or predilections of those others
may affect the content of the law performed, even as it is being performed.
Lacking the writer's luxury of formulating decisions in private, performative judges making public pronouncements must be both socially sensitive
and socially persuasive. Furthermore, what is presented as law on one
occasion before one group may not correspond exactly to what is presented
as law on another occasion before another group. Performative law thus
tends to be open-textured.
The general importance of social contact in performance cultures encourages performative "lawmakers" to make special efforts to preserve the
human relationships that make socialization (and thus communication)
possible and pleasurable. In the event of a conflict between individuals,
performative authorities tend to prefer arbitration and compromise to adjudication because the former techniques bring parties together and help
sustain relationships and dialogue while the latter process creates competition and conflict that inhibits dialogue, strains relationships, and may ultimately endanger the cultural corpus. Performative law even defines many
wrongs in relational rather than in purely physical or economic terms.
Disloyal acts, or acts that socially separate an individual from the communication or company of others by shaming him, are particularly odious.
Additionally, performance is dynamic. Unlike writing, it expresses
meaning by action, not stasis. It lives in energetic and frequently mobile
combinations of sensory media and not in physically fixed words. By virtue of being dynamic, performance is most effective at communicating
meanings that are themselves dynamic. In other words, because it is action, it is better at describing and depicting action than it is at describing
and depicting inaction. In this sense performance has much in common
with television, a modern dynamic medium. Just as thought, as a static
abstraction, makes bad television, it makes bad performance. A story, on
the other hand, makes good television and good performance. Because of
this, actions quickly become the primary type-even the measure-of
performative reality, to the extent that concepts and situations that we
would consider inherently inactive (such as contemplation) are in performance often translated into action (such as a conversation between a
hero and his spirit).3 26 Intellectually, performance cultures revolve around
326 On this remarkable phenomenon in early Greek culture, see R.W. Sharples, But Why Has
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"becomings" rather than "beings,"'
is.

27

what happens as opposed to what

The dynamism of performance is arguably 'eflected in the performative
inclination to think of law not as things but as acts, not as rules or agreements, but as processes constituting rule or agreement. A performative
contract, for instance, is not an object, but a routine of words and gestures.
A witness to a contract testifies not to the identity or correctness of a piece
of paper, but to phenomena seen and heard. Likewise, members of performance cultures tend to think of justice not as something that simply is,
but rather as something that is done. This may help to explain why the
legal systems of performance cultures seem more concerned with matters
of procedure than matters of substance, to the point where "substantive
law has at first the look of being . . . secreted in the interstices of
3 28
procedure.
Finally, lacking any permanent record, performance is ephemeral. Because it exists in time, it is constantly coming into and going out of existence. This is somewhat ironic, given that performance itself is-at least
in part-calculated to mitigate the inherent ephemerality of its sensory
components. Obviously, mitigating the problem does not eliminate it. The
ephemerality of performance makes the cultural corpus of performancebased societies exceedingly vulnerable both to intentional and unintentional change. Such changes cannot readily be detected where no fixed
physical records of lore and learning exist. At the same time, the ephemerality of performance encourages members of performance cultures to organize and orchestrate performance to maximize memorability and minimize the likelihood of change. In many performance cultures, these goals
are accomplished by a combination of publicization, concretization, and
stylization. Performance is publicized by being presented in front of many
people rather than in front of few, the theory being that in such a setting
more people are likely to remember it. Performance is concretized not
only by having a physical reality, but by evoking ideas and experiences
which themselves can be imagined as having physical reality, and are
My Spirit Spoken With Me Thus?: Homeric Decision-Making, 30 GREECE & ROME 1 (1983).
32 This terminology, drawn from Greek philosophy, is elaborated in HAVELOCK, supra note 20,
at 182.
328 SIR HENRY S. MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (New York,
Henry Holt and Company 1883).
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therefore more amenable to memory. Performance is stylized by being cast
in formats that are easily recalled by reference to a recurrent sound, pattern, or brief formula.
*Each of these mnemonic strategies has a legal counterpart. In a sense,
ephemerality is the greatest enemy of law in any society. The very concept
of law implies the continuing existence of standards. To the extent that
law mandates the application of yesterday's rule today, it requires first
that yesterday's rule survive, mnemonically if not physically. Performative
contracts are therefore performed in front of many witnesses rather than
few; performative disputes are resolved in public rather than in private;
performative legislation is announced on the village common rather than
solely in the king's chamber. For the convenience of memory, performative
legal rules are expressed not in the abstract, but in stories and tales that
evoke the concrete images of actors doing right or wrong. Performative
legal ceremonies rely heavily on memorable aural and visual patterns, on
repetition, on pithy expressions and compact, sometimes exaggerated actions. To the extent that these techniques are successful, performative law
can legitimately claim to be custom, understood as "what was done and
. always has been done." Without generally accessible written records safe
from memory's failings, the meanings and messages of performative law
are nonetheless condemned to change gradually over time. 29
For the moment, of course, all these observations and contentions-even
when cast in their strongest, most provocative forms-are but hypotheses
that must eventually be tested according to anthropological and historical
evidence. Unfortunately, such testing is outside the scope of this Article.
If, however, the reader now has a better understanding of (and feeling
for) communication and legal expression in performance cultures, and in
particular has a sense of how vitally important the phenomenon of performance is to cultural and legal life in these societies, then the Article
will have accomplished its limited purposes. The rest can be left for another day.

31' This change may be so slow and so antithetical to the overriding cultural goal of remembering that individuals within a performative legal system may be altogether unaware of it.

